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Historians have expressed a variety of opinions concerning the true
significance of the Congress of Berlin. While the 1878 meeting did not have
to deal with questions as comprehensive as those discussed in Vienna in
1814-1815 or at Paris in 1856, the Congress of Berlin had great impact in its
own right. While the Berlin meeting made decisions in order to reorganize
the Balkans after years of instability and war, it also created a split in
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relations between the German Empire and Imperial Russia which would
eventually drive the two powers towards conflict in "The Great War" in
1914.
To understand the positions taken by the Great Powers and the
decisions made at the Congress, the thesis describes the nationalist
uprisings which exploded in the Balkans in 1875, when many of the Balkan
peoples revolted against the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Turks. Despite
the effort of the Great Powers to calm the violence, the situation
deteriorated. After an unsuccessful war by Serbia and Montenegro for
liberation from Turkey, the Russians decided to settle the situation
themselves through war against the Turks in 1877-1878. Under the banner
of Slavic unity, the Russians thoroughly defeated the Turks, and then
dictated the harsh peace of San Stefano. At San Stefano, the Russians
attempted to solve "The Eastern Question" unilaterally by creating a
Southeastern Europe under Russian and Slavic domination.
However, statesmen elsewhere in Europe saw the Treaty of San
Stefano as upsetting the balance of power in Europe. This was especially a
concern for Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. For several months
England prepared for war against Russia. It was in this tense atmosphere
that the Congress of Berlin met in 1878.
The thesis then focuses on the Congress itself, which basically
sought to reverse the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano and create a new
balance of power in the Balkans. Under the leadership of German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the Congress eventually agreed on the
Treaty of Berlin, thus avoiding a European war. This agreement created
several new independent countries (including a divided Bulgaria), granted
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Austria-Hungary the right to occupy the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and settled questions concerning the Black Sea, the Danube River, and
Northern Armenia. This solution allowed Europe to remain at peace for
over thirty years.
However, the impact of these decisions had serious consequences on
German-Russian relations, as Tsarist officials blamed Germany for
allowing England and Austria-Hungary to win major concessions at the
Congress. And despite a long-standing friendship, the Tsar threatened a
war of retaliation against Germany. This sudden crisis helped solidify the
growing close relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in
October 1879, a defensive alliance was signed by the two German powers.
This would prove to be the first alliance in the slow build-up of tensions
leading to World War I.
Thus, this thesis undertakes to show that the Congress of Berlin
should rightly be considered a major watershed in European diplomatic
history. Not only did the Congress produce a respectable solution for "The
Eastern Question," but without intending it, also created a irreconcilable
split in German-Russian relations, while encouraging Germany and
Austria-Hungary to form a military alliance. These last points would be
crucial in creating an atmosphere necessary for a major war in August
1914.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Historians have had differing opinions on the significance of the 1878
Congress of Berlin. George E. Buckle made that clear by stating
the Congress of Berlin, with its resulting treaty, is a
landmark in the diplomatic history of the Nineteenth
Century; but of the real value and importance of its
work, there have been very varying appreciations. I
Indeed, there seems to be no real agreement on the Congress, as W. N.
Medlicott wrote, "in reality, the Congress was an exercise in guesswork
and make-believe for all the powers."2 Commenting on the ensuing Treaty
of Berlin, J. A. Marriott noted that "the enduring significance of the treaty
is to be found .. .in the new nations which were arising upon the ruins of
that [Ottoman] Empire."3 However, L. S. Stavrianos completely disagreed:
an essential feature of the treaty was its disregard of
ethnic and nationalist considerations ... For the Balkan
peoples, then the Treaty of Berlin meant frustration of
nationalist aspirations and future wars.4

1 George Earle Buckle, Life QfBenjamin Disrael, 1876-1881, vol. 6
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), 310.

2 W. N. Medlicott, IM Con~ess !l!Berlin .and .Afifil:--A Diplomatic
Histox:y Qf ~ ~ Eastern Settlement. 1878-1880, 134.
3 J. A. R. Marriott, '.Ille. Eastern Question--A Studv in European
Diplomacy, 4th ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 345.
4 L. S. Stavrianos, ~Balkans. 1815-1914 (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
Winston, 1963), 70-71.
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With such varying opinions on the 1878 Congress and on the decisions
made there, then it should be a fascinating topic to study.
To recognize the importance of the Congress, consider the fact that
the meeting took place in a crucial period of European history, as many
changes had recently occurred on the continent. For instance, the Berlin
Congress was the first major international meeting after the unification of
Germany. This is imperative to keep in mind, for the defeat of France had
made united Germany the most powerful country in Western Europe after
1871. The fact that the Congress was held in Berlin reflected Germany's
new power, as before 1871, such crucial meetings were held in some city
such as Paris, London, or Vienna.
Some very prominent individuals who are still greatly admired and
studied played major roles at Berlin, and they also signify the importance of
the meeting. Foremost among those figures was the distinguished
German Chancellor, Prince Otto von Bismarck. Since Bismarck acted as
the president of the Berlin proceedings, and since the other delegates
accepted Bismarck's solution of partitioning the Ottoman Empire in order
to maintain European peace, it can be argued that the 1878 Congress
represented Bismarck's height of influence and power in Europe. There
were other famous individuals at that meeting, such as British Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli, and Lord Robert Salisbury, the then British
Foreign Minister and future Prime Minister. Also there was the AustroHungarian Foreign Secretary Count Julius Andrassy, a man who played a
decisive role in the Congress. Meanwhile, the Russian Ambassador to
London, Count Peter Shuvalov, eventually gained the most respect of the
Russian delegation in the eyes of the other delegates. This is despite the
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fact that Shuvalov did not hold the highest position in the Russian
commission. These individuals and others will be discussed as well in this
historical study.
The decisions made at the 1878 meeting were also important. The
Congress' main goal was to solve "The Eastern Question," that is,
determining who would control Southeastern Europe after the Ottoman
Empire lost control of their territories in the Balkans. Indeed, the Congress
was successful in creating a generally peaceful situation in Southeastern
Europe which lasted for over thirty years. The Congress of Berlin also
represented another attempt to solve major continental problems by
"Conference Diplomacy."
Conference Diplomacy dates from the beginning of the
western state-system at the Congress of Westphalia
[1642-1648], which ended the Thirty-Years War. It was
used with increased frequency in th Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries. 5
These conferences were "large-scale multilateral diplomatic negotiations
conducted at international meetings."6 But a "Congress" was the highest
level meeting that existed in the diplomatic world, as a Congress would
convene only to discuss a very specific topic, and it would include the
highest-ranking representatives of all the European powers, all of whom

5 Jack S. Plano and Roy Olton,~ International Relations
Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), 212.

6

Ibid., 212.
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would be equal in voting power while at the Congress. 7 There would be
other conferences after Berlin, but never with the title of "Congress."
One nation that tried to take advantage of Germany's new power at
the Congress was Russia. Traditionally, Russia and Prussia had always
had close ties, and after German unification, Russia hoped to use
Germany's strength to achieve some of her long-held foreign objectives.
Thus, when the Congress convened in Berlin, Tsarist officials expected
Germany to continue to support Russia as she always had done before. But
when the decisions made at Berlin did not satisfy the Tsar, Russian
officials believed that they had been deserted by Germany. Worst yet, the
Tsar thought that Germany had given her full support to Russia's rival in
the Balkans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Tsar never fully forgave
Germany for her actions in 1878, and so after the Berlin Congress,
Russian-German relations were never quite the same again.
Thus, in looking for a root cause for war in 1914 between Germany,
Austria-Hungary and Russia, then one must seriously consider the
Congress of Berlin of 1878, as this was the turning point where relations
between these three nations noticeably started to deteriorate. As before
1878, these three powers had made up the Three Emperors' League CDfil:
Dreikaiserbund), an association started in 1873 (and renewed in 1881) of
friendship, ideology, and cooperation. Although the three states were never
formally allied, there were many long-standing links between them.
7 This type of Congress should not be confused with the 'Congress
System' "instituted by Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance of Britain,
Austria, Prussia and Russia, signed in Paris in 1815." For soon, England
withdrew from this system, and then it finally collapsed by 1825. A. W.
Palmer, A Dictionary Qf Modern History. 1789-1945 (London: The Cresset
Press, 1962), 68.
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Although no doubt many differences existed within the Dreikaiserbund,
none of them was so serious that negotiations could not solve them. But
when Russia perceived, rightly or wrongly, that it was Germany which
blocked the achievement of their goals at the Congress in 1878, then the
Tsar spoke openly for the first time of attacking his western neighbors in
retaliation.
While the 1878 meeting started the degeneration in relations between
Russia and Germany, the Berlin Congress also represented the
corresponding solidification of relations between Germany and AustriaHungary. For these two nations signed a defensive military alliance in
1879, soon after the Tsar had made his war threats known. This close
friendship between the two German powers lasted until 1918.
Thus, the purpose of this historical investigation is to portray the 1878
Congress of Berlin as a particularly significant event in European
diplomacy, not only because of the decisions that it took towards solving the
"Eastern Question," but also as a root cause of later Russo-German
antagonism (which eventually erupted in 1914) and the Austro-German
alliance of 1879.
But in order to study the Congress of Berlin fully, the situation in
Europe leading up to the Congress must be presented and understood. This
means analyzing the crucial shifts in Europe after 1871, as well as the
uprisings in the Balkans starting in 1875. The resulting Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-1878 will also then be reviewed, for it was the reaction to the
outcome of this war that forced the Congress to be called.
The focus of this investigation will then shift to the meeting itself in
1878, the powers and individuals of the Congress, and the decisions made.

6
Finally, the consequences of the Congress as well as the reactions to the
meeting will be examined, including the signing of the Dual Alliance.
Thus, this thesis aims to inform the reader in detail of the events
concerning the Congress of Berlin of 1878, as well as the ramifications
associated with it.

CHAPTER II

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, BEFORE 1875
In order to understand the Congress of Berlin fully, it is necessary to
consider the positions of the powers that participated in the meeting. This
is especially important because many aims and policies of the Great Powers
had shifted in the years prior to the 1878 Congress, mainly because of the
significant changes to the European continent.
For a period after the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, Europe for the
most part remained relatively unchanged, since the major powers at that
meeting had agreed to create a balance of power and to work together to
maintain that system as much as possible. For a generation, this
arrangement worked, as it was mutually beneficial for all the Great
Powers. That long-standing order was seriously tested for the first time by
Imperial Russia, when they attempted expansion into the Ottoman Empire
during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. It was mainly the cooperation of
Great Britain and France which managed to stop the Russian quest to
dominate the Balkan region. For it was the main task of the European
Concert created at Vienna to stop any attempt by a single power or a
coalition to gain a commanding position on the continent. The 1856 Treaty
of Paris, which ended the Crimean War, recreated a balance in the
Balkans, strengthened the position of the Ottoman Empire in Europe once
again, and greatly weakened Imperial Russia's ability to attempt a similar
attack later. In the 1856 treaty, Russia was "forbidden to maintain naval
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forces in the Black Sea or to build ... arsenals on its shores ... [and] Russia
was required to cede to Moldavia three districts of Southern Bessarabia. "8
However, the Treaty of Paris did not create the long-lasting peace that
the powers thought it would. Rather, "the Crimean War left Europe in an
anarchical situation in which more powers were interested in revising
what was left of the balance than were interested in preserving it. "9 As for
the defeated nation, after 1856, Russia "neglected everything in Europe for
the sake of her national interests. Or rather, for the sake of her national
honor."10 This meant that Russia would do all that it could to destroy the
humiliating Treaty of Paris.
In order to do this, Russia first launched necessary large-scale
reforms in society and government, and she also rebuilt her army. To
carry this out, she more or less isolated herself from European affairs to
make these improvements. While in this isolation, they allowed changes to
be made on the European map. The Tsarist government did not forget that
their long-time ideological friend, Austria, had not come to their aid in the
Crimean War and, in fact, even forced the Tsar to sue for peace. With this
in mind, Russia thought Austria deserved punishment. The first sign of
this came with the unification of the Italian peninsula in the 1860's, in

8 Barbara Jelavich, TM Ottoman Empire, The Great Powers, .and~
Straits Questions, 1870-1887 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press), 20.
9 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force .and StatecraftDiplomatic Problems 2f Qm: Time (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983), 36.

10 A. J.P. Taylor,~ Stru~~le Em: Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918
(Oxford, England: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1954), 90-91.
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which Italy gained lands from Austria by diplomacy and war. The
Russians manifested their anger a second time when they did not interfere
with Prussia's defeat of Austria in 1866. Thus, the decision not to help the
Russians in Crimea had come back to haunt the Austrians.
Austria was not the only power which provoked the Russian desire
for revenge. Tsar Alexander II also despised France for its role in the
Crimea, and when Prussia defeated France in a stunning fashion in 18701871, Russia did nothing to prevent it. With the Prussian victory over
France, the long-awaited unification of Germany was completed. The Tsar
thought he could use the new Germany as a way to obtain some of his
foreign policy objectives. But it was not long after German unification that
the Tsar realized that the new Germany was more powerful--and
threatening--than he had anticipated. This was especially a concern for
Russian Foreign Secretary Alexander Gorchakov, who did not trust
Bismarck.
The unification of Germany into a single nation-state had profound
impacts in the European balance of power, a change that would last until
1918 and beyond. The rapid German military victory over France had
proven beyond the doubt that the dominance of the French army had ended.
With the military victory, Germany (which now also included the annexed
French provinces of Alsace-Lorraine) became the most powerful nation in
Europe west of Russia. But with these developments for Germany also
came responsibility, as she was forced to assume France's role as the
center of European diplomacy, whether they wanted it or not. That would
be a great burden for the new state, but luckily, German policy was guided
by the brilliant Chancellor, Prince Otto van Bismarck, who was well-
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qualified to master such a position as that of the continent's leading
diplomat. Yet even he would soon find that such a position had many
potential problems.
After the French defeat by Prussia, their Emperor Napoleon III
abdicated, and the Third Republic was proclaimed. This change fit in
perfectly with Bismarck's designs. For as long as Germany held the two
French provinces (Alsace-Lorraine), Bismarck feared for a French
nationalist drive to retake the regions. However, in Bismarck's eyes, such
an attempt was far less likely under a democratically-elected government
than under a possibly ambitious and nationalistic monarchy. Thus,
Bismarck openly expressed his wish that France should
choose not restoration [of the monarchy], but remain a
republic. This form of government .. .in Bismarck's
view, best calculated to perpetuate French isolation and
weakness. I I
A constant effort to keep France isolated from the rest of Europe became the
basis--and perhaps obsession--of Bismarck's foreign policy.I2
However, France's isolation after 1871 was not all of Bismarck's
work. The real and symbolic loss in power and status lost them many
friends and admirers. "What France had lost was not so much two
provinces, as the primacy of Europe ... the lost provinces were a symbol of
lost greatness. "I3 To remedy this problem of isolation, France decided to
11 W.R. Fryer and B. Litt, "The Republic and the Iron Chancellor:
The Pattern of French-German Relations, 1841-1890," Royal Historical
Transactions 29 (1979): 177.

I2 Bismarck agreed with Russian Ambassador Pete Shuvalov, that he
had constant nightmares about a possible hostile coalition against
Germany: Otto Furst von Bismarck, Gedanken l!llil Errinnerun~en Zweiter
Band (Stuttgart, J. G. Cottasche Buchlandlung, 1915), 269.
13 Fryer and Litt, 171.
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temporarily accept the new situation and not involve themselves in serious
international disputes. In this manner, France chose to allow the Three
Northern Powers to deal with the Eastern Question alone, hoping that the
members of the Dreikaiserbund would fight among themselves over their
conflicting ideas in Southeastern Europe. If this had happened, then
France envisioned that the Three Emperors' League might well have
collapsed over these disagreements.
Austria, too, had long played an important role in European
diplomacy, and in maintaining the Concert of Europe.14 But the Austrian
defeat by Prussia meant that its dominating position in Germany had
finally come to a close with the Treaty of Prague in 1866. However, a hope of
revenge was held by many Austrians who had been active in the
government for a long time.
The collapse of the German settlement of the Treaty of
Prague was in no sense a foregone conclusion.
[Austrian Foreign Minister Count Frederick] Beust's
German policy for involving Austria-Hungary was by no
means a proven failure.15
But any real chance of that vanished with the 1871 French defeat. "Austria
was cooperative with France and hostile to Germany until Sedan, and then
after Sedan, she became hostile toward France and cooperative with

14 The Austrian belief in maintaining the conservative order and
balance of power had dominated their foreign policy since the Congress of
Vienna of 1815. Winfried Baumgart, Y2m Europaischen Konzert z..u.m
Vt>lkerbund (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 197 4), 4-5.
15 F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa .t..Q. Saraievo-~ Forei~n Policy Qf
1866-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 44.

Austria-Hun~ary,
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Germany."16 To fully indicate that a new policy towards Germany was
being implemented in 1871, Beust, "who was evidently not the man to
inspire confidence at Berlin, was dismissed, and ... Count Julius Andrassy
became minister of foreign affairs."17 For Beust had "plans for a South
German Confederation to bind the southern states together against
Prussia."18 But Andrassy had no desire of reasserting Austria's role in
German affairs. Rather, as a Hungarian, he was much more concerned
about possible threats from the eastern neighbor, Russia. Furthermore,
Andrassy wanted to block any attempt to create a large Slavic state to the
south of Austria.
The Magyars felt themselves stranded in the great Slavic
sea of Eastern Europe, and saw their only hope in the
alliance with Germany ... His [Andrassy's] object,
therefore, was to draw the Germans away from the
Russians, and attach them to the Austrian side.19
In fact, Andrassy once said, "Austria's mission remains ... to be a bulwark
against Russia, and only so long as she fulfills this mission is her existence
a necessity for Europe. "20
16 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in
International History-Theory and Reality," Journal !2f Conflict Resolution
17, no. 1(1973):41.
17 William L. Langer, European Alliances !m.d. Alirnments. 1871-

1.fillil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), 19-20. Count Beust, who

came to the foreign ministry in 1866, still harbored revenge dreams against
Prussia. During the Franco-Prussian War, he gave serious consideration
into intervening for the French, but the war was decided too quickly. Thus,
in order to build close relations with Berlin, Beust had to go.
18 Bridge, 44.
19 Langer, 20.
20

Bridge, 50.
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Andrassy's advancement to the position of foreign minister also
represented another major change in Austria since their 1866 defeat. This
major setback, while not bringing down the government as in France in
1870, had forced a lasting change in the structure of the Habsburg
Monarchy. The defeat encouraged the different nationalities of the
monarchy to demand more power and rights, especially the Hungarians,
as they constituted the largest and most organized non-German populace
in the empire. The outcome of this campaign was the creation of the
"Aus~leich"

(settlement) of 1867. This meant that
... the Habsburg Empire remained under a single
ruler, who presided over a newly formed Dual
Monarchy as emperor of Austria and king of
Hungary. The emperor was still the supreme
authority.... The unity of the empire was
maintained in the three crucial fields of foreign
policy, war and finance .... In all other respects,
the two parts of the empire were separate.21

Thus, "the

Aus~leich

was to mark the permanent defeat of the

Germanizers in the empire, which from now on, had to be governed to a far
greater extent... through the non-German elements."22 What this meant
was, that while the Germans in Austria often wanted to pursue one policy,
the Hungarians would use their new powers to object. In these situations,
it was usually the Hungarians who got their wish, as they were more
successful at using their voice in matters of foreign policy. In fact, the
21 Norman Rich, ~~ill Nationalism .and Reform, 1850-1890, 2d
ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), 205. The Aus~leich
also spelled out constitutional reforms, and gave jurisdiction of certain
areas of the empire to either Austrian or Hungarian authorities, including
areas inhabited mainly by Slavs. For more on Aus~leich, see Rich, 202-216.
22 Ibid., 205.
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Hungarian voice in foreign policy would usually dominate AustroHungarian thinking until 1918.
As for Russia, her decision to allow German unification had
immediate results. "Russia had used the occasion of the French-Prussian
War to secure the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of
Paris. "23 Thus, the Tsar was successful in destroying part of that hated
peace treaty. But this was just the first step, as the Russians had bigger
goals in mind. "Russia often changed her policy ...but her purpose was ever
constant and clear--to acquire herself the control over the Straits."24 But
while the internal reforms at home were making progress, the Tsar had to
be mindful of the ever-growing revolutionary and radical elements within
Imperial Russia. Many of the Tsar's foreign policy decisions were geared
towards showing the glory and power of Russia, and to make Russians
more patriotic and proud of the Romanov crown. In this manner, the Tsar
hoped to lessen the danger of a revolution.
Great Britain was also changing policies. After many blunders
during the Crimean War, the English assumed the strategy of "Splendid
Isolation," which meant that they would not involve themselves in another
foreign war unless the fabric of the empire was threatened.25 Instead, it
23 Barbara Jelavich, A Century QfRussian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 160-161. In the Black Sea
Clauses, Russia was forbidden to maintain warships or arsenals on the
sea. Also, the Straits were closed to all warships, but open to all merchant
ships. For more, see Jelavich, 129-130.
24 Baron S. A. Korff, Russia's Foreign Relations During The Last
HalfCentuzy (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922), 114.
25 George Earle Buckle, The Li_& Qf Benjamin Disraeli. 1876-1881, vol.
4, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920). Later, during the 1877
Russo-Turkish War, Disraeli described his country's policy as "one of
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focused attention on domestic and social reforms. With a new powerful
Germany acting as a mediator on the continent, British isolation was
assured. This attitude continued throughout the 1878 Congress.
Finally, the Ottoman Empire must be considered, not because of its
strength, but because of its continual disintegration. The problems of
nationality, religion, and corruption in the old empire were vast. Though
the empire had formally been accepted as a Great Power in the Treaty of
Paris of 1856, all the parties knew that the Sultan depended largely on Great
Britain and Austria for support and protection. The 1856 treaty required
the Sultan to undertake many reforms to strengthen his shaky regime.
Most of these reforms were never implemented, and the situation only
worsened. The likely collapse of the Ottoman Empire opened up questions
concerning who would replace the Turks in the Balkans. This was the
crux of the perpetual "Eastern Question."
This so-called Eastern Question ... was the single major
theme in Great Power diplomacy in this period. The
control of the Ottoman possessions and the central
government was constantly the object of discussion,
negotiation, controversy, and open warfare between the
major powers.26
However, with the growing reports of Turkish atrocities and the refusal to
reform, English interests in maintaining the Turkish Empire were not
quite as vital as they once had been. This was especially the case because
the British had gained "controlling share of the stock of the Suez Canal
Company by the purchase of the shares of the impecunious Khedive of
conditional neutrality--neutrality, that is so long as British interests were
not assailed or menaced .... ", 192.
26 Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire ... , 3.
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Egypt, in November 1875."27 And since the canal gave England a direct
route to India, this meant that the importance of maintaining the Sultan's
hold of the Straits and Constantinople was not as vital as it had been. Why
depend on the weakening Ottoman Empire when England had control of
her own path to India? This shift in policy towards maintaining the status
of Egypt instead of Constantinople also reflected the differences of opinion
between the British political parties over the course of domestic and foreign
policy. The causes of Liberalism were dominating English politics at this
time, and since these ideals stressed social reforms and equality, the last
thing that many people in Britain wanted was to be associated with the
reactionary and backward Ottoman Turks. The Turks discovered this
change in policy and attitudes increasingly as "the value of British support
depended on the readiness and willingness of that power to maintain
its ... role in the east."28 Even Austria-Hungary was losing interest in
maintaining the Sultan's empire.29 Habsburg officials realized that only
the Balkans offered an area of expansion after 1871. Furthermore, if the
Slavic peoples in the Ottoman Empire continued to be a destabilizing factor,
the Dual Monarchy could not allow such serious unrest on its borders. As
a result, the Turks found themselves increasingly isolated, which made

27 Langer, 73.
28 Jelavich, ~Ottoman Empire ... , 6-7. This crucial change in
British foreign policy towards the Turks will be important to keep in mind,
as this was a factor that played a key role up through 1878.
29 "Andrassy's standpoint throughout was ... that the Ottoman
Empire should be maintained as long as possible ... [but if] the Ottoman
Empire went to pieces ... he would have regarded annexation as a necessary
precaution." Langer, 70-71.
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"The Eastern Question" even more of an important element in European
politics. When the Sultan had little or no outside support, then his control
over Southeastern Europe became still more uncertain and weak.
But while much of the attention was focused on the activities of the
Great Powers at this time, the growing forces of nationalism in the Balkans
could not be ignored. Particularly since the Crimean War, the various
peoples of the Balkans were increasingly demanding their independence or
at least autonomy from the Ottoman Turks. This was especially prevalent
in Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. After 1856, these regions had
received a great deal of autonomy, but this did not seem to fully satisfy the
people. The Serbians, for example, represented the largest Slavic
population in the Balkans, and they continued to dream not only of
independence, but also they saw themselves as leading the way to the
creation of a great united Slavic state. But nationalism was not just limited
to these peoples. Despite the best efforts of Turkish authorities to stop the
ideals of nationalism from spreading, other peoples soon learned of it also.
A small Greek state had been formed in the 1830's and had been growing
since; and the Greeks looked to unite all the Greeks into one nation. Even
the isolated Bulgarians, as we shall soon see, were increasingly interested
in the ideals of nationalism.
What was so dangerous about this growing nationalism in the
Balkans was the fact that each nationality had their own brand of
nationalism and goals. This meant that these goals often were conflicting,
and they could not be fully controlled by any of the Great Powers. Although
the Russians thought they could direct most of the Balkan peoples by the
dreams of Pan-Slavism, "the other Slav nations shunned the friendship of
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Russia. Russian friendship or assistance meant much more domination
than federation."30 Another writer commented "the second half of the
Nineteenth Century witnessed the death of Slavism and the birth of a great
variety of regional nationalisms."3 1 Despite this fact, the Russian PanSlavs continued to believe otherwise. But the power most concerned with
the rise of nationalism among the Slavs was Austria-Hungary. Habsburg
officials were always concerned that a great uprising or a war for Slavic
unity might capture the hearts of the Slavs within the Dual Monarchy, and
so Austrian officials always had to work hard to prevent this possibility
from happening.
Thus, with a knowledge of the positions of the situation in Europe
before the Congress of Berlin, we can better understand the policies
followed at the meeting. However, before we discuss the Congress, it is
important to follow the course of events that actually brought about the
meeting, namely the uprisings in the Balkans which started in 1875, and
the subsequent Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

30 Korff, 117.
31 Peter F. Sugar, "The Southern Slav Image of Russia in the
Nineteenth Century," Journal Qf Central European Affairs 21, no. 1 (April
1961): 48.

CHAPTER III
THE BALKAN CRISIS, 1875-1878
When the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856 ending the Crimean
War, the Great Powers thought that they had solved the problems of
Turkish-controlled Southeastern Europe by imposing required reforms on
the Sultan. But despite all the promises and fanfare given these reforms in
1856, most were never implemented. For several years after 1856, the
situation in the Balkans appeared fairly calm, but in reality, it was like a
powder keg ready to explode. Finally, the fuse went off in the summer of
1875 "when the Turkish authorities began to exact by force the excessive
taxes which the Christians refused to pay. At the beginning of July, they
revolted in Herzegovina, and a few weeks later, Bosnia was also set
aflame."32 In addition, "the Sultan's reforms merely contributed to a
rising anger among Moslem Turks against all types of foreign
interference. "33 Thus, two completely opposite groups stubbornly faced one
another in the Balkans--either it was Turk versus minority or the Turk
versus the foreign powers who demanded action towards solving the many
problems in the Balkans. As one author mentions, "the revolts and the

32 Mihailo D. Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 15.
33 G.D. Clayton, Britain filld ~Eastern Question--Missolon~hi .t.Q.
Gallipoli (Londong: University of London Press, Ltd., 1971), 122.
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Eastern Crisis had world-wide consequences for the history of all the
Balkan peoples. "34
The initial aim [of the revolt] seems to have been an
improvement in the quality of Turkish rule, rather than
independence ... [but] whether the rebels wished it or not,
their cause was certain to be taken up by the outside
interested parties. 35
The fact that outside powers became involved was a key element, as
especially Russia and Austria-Hungary had their own goals and concerns
in the Balkans. In fact, the Balkan Crisis presented a perfect opportunity
for Russia, because Alexander II's policy towards the Ottoman Empire
since the Crimean War had changed from forcing its dismemberment to
that of overseeing its natural decay.36
However, for the Habsburg Monarchy, reports of the Balkan
uprisings were anything but good news. It had been a long-held policy of
Austria to maintain the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, mostly because
it was home to many Slavic peoples. For Foreign Minister Andrassy,
"partition of Turkey in Europe was almost as abhorrent to him as its
domination by Russia. "37 Since the Dual Monarchy also contained many
Slavs, the fear was that a nationalist uprising by the Slavs in the
neighboring Ottoman Empire could spread across the border. Given the
extent of the unrest existing in the Balkans, this danger seemed very real.

34 Arnold Suppan, "Bosnischer Aufstand und Orientkrise, 18751878," Osterreichische Osthefte 18, no. 2 (1976): 189.
35 Clayton, 130.
36 Baumgart, 37.
37 Taylor, 248.
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Therefore, Austrian Foreign Minister Andrassy's "great objective was that
all symptoms of solidarity between the insurgents and the South Slavs in
the Dual Monarchy must at any cost be avoided."38 The total contrast
between Russian strategy and Austrian policy was very clear, and with this
divergence came obvious competition and high tensions.
In the early period of the uprisings, both Turkish authorities and the
Great Powers kept the activities from spreading outside the Ottoman
Empire or causing a general Balkans War, but the riots which concerned
Austria-Hungary most closely still continued. Bosnia-Herzegovina laid
directly on the border of the Dual Monarchy, and many of the refugees fled
into Austrian territory, creating high tensions. For not only were many
people fleeing into the Dual Monarchy, causing hardships and shortages,
but also revolutionaries came with the refugees. Hence, Austria became an
unwilling haven for radicals, revolutionary newspapers, and a place to
store weapons to secretly ship into the rebellious regions. With this going
on, Andrassy acted first, by writing to the Sultan "The Andrassy Note" on
January 30, 1876. The note demanded four reforms without delay: a) the
establishment of full religious liberty and equality, b) the abolition of taxfarming, c) the application of the revenues gathered in Bosnia and
Herzegovina entirely to local purposes, and d) the amelioration of the
agricultural population. 39 These required improvements Andrassy
38 George Hoover Rupp, A Wavering Friendship--Russia and
Austria, 1876-1878 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1941), 84.
39 Stephen Pierce Hayden Duggan, ~Eastern Question--A Study in
Diplomacy (New York: AMS Press, 1970), Reprint 1902, 130-131.
Andrassy's note contained more specifics for each of these provisions, thus,
turn to this text for more details.
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wanted included augmenting the basic standard of living and modernizing
rural life. Though this message solved some of the problems of taxation,
government, and religion, Andrassy failed to offer any solutions for the
main issue of nationalism. But this was not surprising, for the Dual
Monarchy had historically discriminated against the Slavs within her own
borders. If Andrassy demanded that wholesale changes be made to
appease the Slavs within the Ottoman Empire, then Austria's own Slavic
population might well demand similar rights. Thus, because "The
Andrassy Note" did not offer any worthwhile or realistic solutions, it
received a very cool response, mostly because the desire for national selfdetermination was the main issue for those who lived in the Balkans,
whereas the issues of taxation and religion were only secondary.
Furthermore, the other Great Powers did not have much respect for
Austria-Hungary's attempt to solve the Balkan uprisings without the
participation of the other powers. Thus, "The Andrassy Note" was doomed
to failure in the minds of both the Great Powers and the Balkan nationals.
"The Andrassy Note" turned out to be just the first in a series of
attempts by the powers to resolve the Balkan uprisings by diplomatic
means, rather than allowing the problem to become more serious.
However, Andrassy's unilateral action particularly disturbed Russia, since
she rightly considered herself entitled to play a vital part in any Balkan
political solution. Moreover, the Austrian note was a violation of the Three
Emperors' League ideal of acting in accordance with the other Northern
Powers on matters in the Balkans. Accordingly, Andrassy urged another
diplomatic move, which brought the Russian Chancellor, Prince
Alexander Gorchakov, to Berlin for a meeting. These talks produced "The
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Berlin Memorandum" on May 13, 1876. "This document merely urged the
Turks to grant an armistice to the rebels and to institute reforms on the
lines of the Andrassy Note. "40 More importantly however, "Russia
consented to Austria's taking a portion of Bosnia [in case of an impending
Balkans War] and reserved Bessarabia for herself.... It was the first
success of the Bismarckian policy of partition."41 Thus, this was also the
first sign of the eventual agreement later made in 1878, that would grant
Austria-Hungary the right to occupy the Turkish provinces of BosniaHerzegovina, while Russia reacquired Bessarabia.
The Berlin Memorandum also signified some other important points.
The constant unrest in the Balkans showed the Austrians that the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was unavoidable, and since the
Turks could not handle the rebellion, perhaps this was a sign that the
disintegration of the empire might come sooner than expected, or worse yet,
turn into a sudden collapse. To prepare for such an eventuality, Andrassy
"could not avoid a policy which prepared the way for the acquisition of the
two Turkish provinces [of Bosnia and Herzegovina]."42 It seems that
Andrassy was the one most resistant to admit this, as annexing the two
provinces would only bring in more Slavs under Habsburg rule. Since
Andrassy was a Hungarian, he did not wish to see that happen, as such an
acquisition threatened the political position the Hungarians achieved in
1867 in the

Aus~leich.

40 Bridge, 76.
41 Stojanovic, 62.
42 Rupp, 35.
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the Hungarians held at least an equal voice in the policies of the Habsburg
Monarchy. But there were already many Slavs in the monarchy who
wished the empire to become a triple monarchy, so "Andrassy was
fundamentally opposed to the inclusion of more Slavs in the Dual
Monarchy, in which the nice balance of German and Magyar was already
threatened."43 If Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by the monarchy, then
that might have given the added pressure needed to force the Habsburg
government to assume a triple monarchy structure. Andrassy wanted to
protect the special powers that the Hungarians had finally achieved in the
Aus~leich,

and that position would be lost in a triple monarchy. But many

other parties had been advocating the annexation of the two provinces for
military and economic reasons. However, the most convincing argument
for Andrassy was the fear that if Austria-Hungary did not get them, then
the areas might be seized by a large Slavic state, possibly a Russian
satellite. Thus, Andrassy finally succumbed to this realization, and,
"incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina came as definite goal, and it
became the dominant active feature of Austrian foreign policy from 1875 on
down to 1914."44
The memorandum also symbolized an agreement on a "policy
pursued by Russia and Austria for over a century past ... [that was] a
division of the [Balkan] Peninsula into an eastern and a western sphere of
influence."45 This is in fact exactly what Bismarck wanted to do anyway,
43 Jbid., 35.
44 Ibid., 25.
45
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England should agree for each of them to occupy in the east--at Turkey's
expense--a position satisfying them for the time being and preventing them
from turning against each other."46 Hence, the two Northern Powers had
adopted Bismarck's plan of partition without realizing it, but they did it only
because it fulfilled both of their vital interests.
However, when the Berlin Memorandum was submitted abroad for
approval, it received a very stem reply from the British. London
rejected joint diplomatic action by the powers as the
means to settle the Balkan Crisis. She was bent on
preserving complete freedom of maneuver and was
determined to prove that the Three Emperors' League
could not settle all problems by its own exclusive
authority.47
In many respects, England's refusal was based not so much on the content
of the memorandum, but rather, on how the authors submitted the note to
London, that is, expecting a favorable answer without prior consultation.
But the answer to the plan was to pursue another strategy. Prime Minister
Disraeli was determined to "recover the role of arbiter, by smashing the
Three Emperors' League."48 Since Germany's unification in 1871, and
especially since the creation of the Dreikaiserbund in 1873, Bismarck and

46 Count Julius Andrassy, Bismarck. Andrassy and Their
Successors (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Company, 1927), 25. It should be
noted that this book was written by the son of the Austrian Foreign
Minister, Andrassy, from 1871-1879.
47 Clayton, 134-135.
48 Ibid., 127.
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the League had taken the initiative in solving the problems of Southeastern
Europe. Yet, Disraeli knew that Russian and Austrian goals clashed in
that region, and if the problems persisted, then the League would collapse
due to a lack of agreement. Disraeli was committed to breaking the
Dreikaiserbund throughout the Congress of Berlin and, as we will see, he
was successful in carrying it out. Notice that Disraeli's strategy was very
similar to the one pursued by France, as explained earlier.
Thus, instead of submitting to the Berlin Memorandum, Disraeli
proposed a conference of the Great Powers, but neither Russia nor Austria
were interested in such a meeting, because both powers believed that they
could get much more out of the war than through diplomacy. In the
meantime, tensions continued to increase in the Balkans, especially
between the small states of Serbia and Montenegro and the Ottoman
Empire, as these two Balkan states also supported the insurrection
elsewhere in the region. The impending Balkans War seemed imminent.
On June 10, 1876,
A treaty of alliance and a military convention were
signed [between Serbia and Montenegro], which
provided for the cooperation of the two states in both the
diplomatic and military fields for the purpose of
liberating the Balkan Christians, and especially the
Serbs, from the Turkish yoke.49
And finally, despite the attempts of some of the powers (mainly England) to
stop a Balkans War, hostilities erupted on June 30, 1876. Both the Serbs and
Montenegrens hopes this war of liberation would spread throughout the
Balkans and liberate all the Slavs.

49 Stojanovic, 84.
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Such a hope was not a monopoly of the Balkans states; it was also
harbored by many in Russia. Here, "the declaration of war ... was part and
parcel of the grand plan of the Pan-Slav committees for a general Balkans
rising, and was essentially the beginning of war unofficially by Russia on
the Ottoman Empire. "50 But even those of Pan-Slavic sentiment knew that
"Serbia was not expected to defeat the Turks, but only to sustain the
struggle for two months. Within that time, Russia would be prepared to
enter the war herself."51 For most Russians, Serbia represented the best
hope for a Slavic victory, since they constituted the largest Slavic group in
Southeastern Europe.
In the meantime, both Russia and Austria-Hungary saw this war as
an opportunity to gain something for nothing. This was especially true for
Russia, but if the situation looked promising enough, the Tsar intended to
intervene in the war to make even bigger gains. The Dual Monarchy had a
different view. If the Balkan alliance succeeded in their war with the
Sultan, they might gain so much land and confidence that they would
decide to tum on Austria-Hungary itself in order to liberate the Slavs there
as well. But at the same time, the war presented the opportunity to gain
further Russian approval for Austria to occupy the provinces of BosniaHerzegovina, and, thus, gain the provinces with no effort.
With this in mind, Austrian Foreign Minister Andrassy and
Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov met again in July 1876, and this time
they signed the Reichstadt Agreement. In this treaty, "the two emperors
50 Rupp, 124.
51 Stojanovic, 85.

28
had agreed on complete non-interference in the Serb war on Turkey." 52
Furthermore, "although there was subsequent disagreement about the
arrangements concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia was clearly
allowed to resume her frontiers of 1856."53 Moreover, in the event of a
Slavic victory, Serbia and Montenegro were to gain small areas in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, while the remainder of the provinces were to go to the
Habsburg Monarchy. Also, "Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Albania 'may'
become autonomous states, and Constantinople a free city, while Thessaly
and Crete fell to Greece."54
However, such an ambitious plan never came about, as the Balkan
states were soundly defeated. Only when the Sultan threatened the
annihilation of Serbia and Montenegro in October 1876, did the Tsar
demand that an armistice be granted by Turkey, and threatened that if she
did not bring the war to an end, Russia would declare war. Thus, "the
defeat of Serbia endangered her [Turkey's] position, and [this] forced her to
accept the mediation of the powers," which were scheduled to meet in
Constantinople in December 1876. 55
The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 had another significant result, aside
from the fact that the Balkan states lost it.
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The main effect of Serbia's defeat was that Pan-Slav and
Russian popular sympathy was now centered almost
exclusively on Bulgaria; the Russians were far more
prepared now to abandon Serbia and certainly Bosnia
and Herzegovina to Vienna. 56
This is because the Pan-Slavs had long-supported Serbian efforts in order to
achieve their objectives, but the Serbs were never able to be victorious. Once
more, Austria-Hungary could make sure that they did not succeed in
creating a great Slavic state. Since this was the case, then, the Bulgarians
appeared to actually be the best choice, because of the size of their
population, and geographically, they were closer to Russia and further
from possible Austrian interference. Also, Bulgaria would have brought
Russia much closer to controlling the crucial Straits to the Black Sea.
During this war, while trying to quell other nationalist uprisings in
the South Balkans, Turkish armies became very brutal, and committed
what became known as 'The Bulgarian Atrocities.' "Just how many people
lost their lives during these horrible conflicts has never been known," but
there was definitely a great number of casualties and injuries, as well as
property damage.57 The uncertain reports on these numbers was partly
due to the conflicting accounts of journalists who often exaggerated, but "an
official Turkish estimate set the casualties at 3,100 Christians and 400
Muslims. An American investigator estimated the dead at 15,000, while
Bulgarian historians have claimed losses of 30,000 to 60,000."58 The news of
the atrocities spread like wildfire through the newspapers of the world, and
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especially in England, where social reforms were the popular subject of the
day. Yet, this outrage was only the worst of a series of humanitarian
crimes. "The news of the Bulgarian atrocities, then, came just at a time
when many people in England had already lost all sympathy with the
Turks and their government. "59 Many people in all aspects of British
society started questioning the wisdom of supporting a regime such as the
Sultan's. The major voice in opposing British support of the Turks came
from William Gladstone, the former prime minister and head of the Liberal
Party. He spoke out many times about the atrocities in parliament almost
immediately after the offenses became known. He also wrote extensively on
the subject, including a short book, entitled Bule-arian Horrors.
Gladstone's bitter attacks had profound effects on Disraeli's popularity and
power in England. Consequently, England went to the Constantinople
Conference in an awkward position, as the other powers, especially Russia,
were aware of the outcry that came about in Britain because of the
Bulgarian Atrocities.
It was only natural that the Russians should deduce from this
vigorous anti-Turk movement that the English government would be quite
unable to take a strong stand against the Russian policy in favor of the
Southern Slavs.60
The Constantinople Conference, which was made up of the major
powers as well as Serbia and Montenegro, came together in December 1876
to discuss a solution to the 1876 war and the Balkan uprisings. Although it
was a full year-and-a-half before the opening of the Congress of Berlin,
Bismarck had the same apprehensions about this conference as he would
59
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later have about the Berlin meeting. Bismarck believed that the
Constantinople Conference
would bring the existence of the Three Emperors'
League into question, as it would inevitably deepen the
divergences between Russia and Austria. Germany
would be compelled to take sides, which she could not do
without hurting one of her allies. Even if the powers
came to an agreement, he doubted the success of their
action in Constantinople.61
In many respects, the Constantinople meeting was a showdown
between British policy and Russian ambitions. British plans at
Constantinople were the same as usual--independence and integrity of
Turkey, no special commercial concessions there, a system of autonomy for
Serbia and Montenegro, and reforms in Bulgaria.62 On the other hand,
before the conference began, Tsar Alexander II said in an address to the
nobles in Moscow, that "if the conference failed to bring peace, and if he
could not obtain the guarantees which he desired from the Porte, he was
firmly resolved to take independent action."63 For its part, Austria did not
have much respect for the conference, and assumed that a war would
inevitably develop after the meeting adjourned. Andrassy only went to
Constantinople to prevent Balkan self-rule, as "in that event, the road to
Austria's expansion in the east would be closed," especially in BosniaHerzegovina. 64
61 Stojanovic, 99.
62 R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, .and~ Eastern Question
(New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1962): 108.
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It seems that none of the powers present at the meeting had a strong

urge to see the conference prevail; "England was the only power directly
concerned who was whole-heartedly anxious for the conference to succeed.
It rested therefore exclusively upon England's representative to induce the

Turks to submission. "65 The Ottoman Empire also had a pessimistic view
of the meeting. They had just finished thoroughly defeating Serbia and
Montenegro, while England had just sent warships to Besika Bay in the
Black Sea Straits to show their support for the Turks against Russia. In
such a position, the Turks felt no real need to submit to more reforms
imposed by the foreign powers. This became especially apparent during the
meetings, as when on December 21, 1876, the conference delegates were
interrupted by the sound of cannons firing, proclaiming that a new Sultan,
Abdul Hamid, had taken power, and he had just granted a liberal
constitution, or at least liberal by Turkish standards. With such reforms
installed in the new constitution, "the proposed reforms [of the conference]
were superfluous [in the opinion of the Turks]"66
Nevertheless, the conference continued. In the end,
the powers as a whole endorsed Salisbury's program,
which ... created tributary states, favored the status quo
in Serbia and Montenegro, and ... proposed a large
measure of administrative autonomy for Bosnia and
Bulgaria. 67
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Furthermore, Bulgaria was split into two provinces north and south along
the Balkan Mountains. Though the Russians originally wanted to create a
single and large Bulgaria like they would attempt in 1878, Ignatiev, the
Russian representative, knew that he had little to support such an
enormous claim. Thus, he was willing to settle for the next best thing, a
divided Bulgaria with a system of autonomy. Furthermore, the division of
Bulgaria was seen by the powers as a punishment to the Turks for the
crimes committed in the Bulgarian Atrocities. But most significantly, this
division of Bulgaria was the first sign of the agreement made at the 1878
Congress of Berlin. However, these plans made at Constantinople never
became reality. The new Sultan, Hamid, refused to submit to the Russian
and English demands. Thus, "the success of the Russian ambassador was
complete ... [as now] Russia was left free to make war for which she had
been anxious to find a pretext without the danger of protest of any
quarter."68 Since the Turks had refused the demands of a united Europe,
not even England could justify a war to defend the Sultan. This was exactly
what the Tsar was hoping for--a war against the Turks that was sanctioned
by the rest of Europe.
When the conference ended on January 20, 1877, it did not take long
for Russo-Turkish relations to degenerate even more. In addition, "the
Russian foreign ministry found itself increasingly under open attack from
those in the Russian public and government who wished the resumption of
a glorious national policy."69 This was especially the case for the Pan68 Rupp, 265.
69 Jelavich,
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Slavists, who were disappointed with the outcome of the Serbo-Turkish War
and the Constantinople Conference. They claimed that Russia had been
humiliated by ~e Turks at that meeting, and now it was time to finally
strike. But in order to avoid a possible coalition of nations (as in the
Crimean War) against Russia in the approaching war, the Tsar worked to
guarantee himself a free hand by obtaining foreign approval, especially
from Austria-Hungary. Representatives of the two countries met again,
and they signed the Convention of Budapest on January 12, 1877. In it,
Austria-Hungary promised to "observe benevolent neutrality... and it would
take diplomatic action to prevent intervention of other powers [mainly Great
Britain]."70 Also, by an "Additional Convention" (not actually signed until
March 18, 1877), Vienna "consented to Russia's annexation of Bessarabia,
but was in her turn guaranteed the possession of Bosnia and
Herzegovina."71 So while Russia obtained Austria's neutrality, the price
they paid was very high. For "she [Austria] not only on paper set a bound
and limit to Russian advances, but she made it certain that a victorious
Russia could not .. .ignore the claims and vital interests of her hated
Danubian rival. "72 Perhaps of all the agreements made before the
Congress of Berlin, this is the one that was most important. Without
German interference, Russia agreed to a limited victory, and this treaty
also promised that the Dual Monarchy would gain substantially from the
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Russian effort. This is exactly what Tsarist officials would complain about
later after the Berlin Congress!
To further secure his position, as war started with Turkey, the Tsar
issued a circular note explaining that he had exhausted
all the means in her power to arrive at a lasting peace by
a common action with the Great Powers ... [and] it was
no longer in the interest of Europe to allow the
prolongation of such a state of things. 73
The Tsar knew that Britain could not help the Turks because of the public
opinion in England against the Sultan's regime. After the series of
atrocities committed by the Turks, and as the Turks continued to refuse
true reform, the British public would not have supported a war to prop up
such a regime. In fact, the English public actually first supported the
Russians, as they believed that the Turks deserved punishment. Prime
Minister Disraeli was aware of such sentiment. So with both Great Britain
and the Dual Monarchy neutralized, "Russia began a Turkish War
in ... favorable circumstances, ... never had the diplomatic field been so well
prepared."74
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CHAPTER IV
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877 -1878
The Tsar gave one last effort to force reforms on the Ottoman Empire
with the proposed London Protocol, which was signed by the other
European powers on March 31, 1877. Basically, it was the same plan as
adopted at the Constantinople Conference, with a few variations and with
different deadlines for administration of the reforms. However, the Sultan
refused to accept this idea, and the long-awaited Russo-Turkish War soon
became reality.75 The Tsar's patience had worn out, and satisfied that the
Turks would receive no outside help, he declared war on the Ottoman
Empire on April 24, 1877.
Russian troops had been preparing for battle for sometime, as they
had massed two forces (one at the Rumanian frontier, and one in the
Caucasus) for an invasion into Turkey. While the latter army was to push
as far into Armenia as possible and also secure the eastern coasts of the
Black Sea, the other force looked to advance as quickly as possible into the
Balkans, with the city of Constantinople as their ultimate goal. After some
delays due to poor planning and execution, the first offensives were very
successful, especially into the Balkans. Rumania, which was still an
autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire, had helped the Russian cause
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by allowing passage of Tsarist troops. However, that in itself was a very
complicated situation and will be discussed later.
The British government was divided on its policy concerning the war.
Disraeli did not favor intervention on the side of Turkey unless England's
most vital interests were at stake. 76 He was still upset about the Sultan's
negligent attitude towards the reforms asked for by the powers, and he was
also aware of the dislike that the English populace had for the Turks at this
time, especially after The Bulgarian Atrocities. But Queen Victoria was
much more determined to meet the Russian advance, as the strategic
location of Turkey was still the key consideration for her. On the eve of the
war, the Queen
appealed to the feelings of patriotism ... [and] the absolute
necessity of showing a bold and united front to the enemy
in the country as well as outside it [the British
Empire] .... It is not the question of upholding Turkey; it
is the question of Russian or British supremacy in the
world! 7 7
But after much deliberation, England decided to maintain a policy of
"watchful and conditional neutrality," naming British interests in Turkey,
Constantinople, Egypt, and the Suez Canal as off limits to Russian
ambitions. 78 Meanwhile, Austria hoped that the Tsar would limit Russia's
gains to those promised in the Treaty of Budapest.
The initial Russian successes concerned the English, as it appeared
that they had misjudged Russian troop strength. Soon, London was
76 Buckle,
77
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making preliminary plans to ship a force, possibly involving also Austrian
troops, to help defend Constantinople.
Disraeli wanted the support of the Austrian army to
make it clear to Russia that she would have to counter
with armed resistance to Austria and Great Britain if
she occupied Constantinople or refused to accept
revision of her terms. 79
However, just when the situation appeared lost, Turkish forces made a
valiant stand at Plevna in mid-July, 1877, and stopped the Russian
advance. The Turks withstood two onslaughts there and then went on their
own offensive in August, successfully pushing back Russian lines.
Suddenly the immediate danger to Constantinople was diminished and the
war dragged on towards an uncertain duration and conclusion. England
was naturally very relieved by this news, as the Russians had suffered a
significant defeat at the hands of the Turks.
In the meantime, for the Pan-Slavs, this war
gave fresh impetus to the agitation of the Slavophils, who
considered this war as their own work and believed that
it was undertaken for the Slav Idea. Popular excitement
stimulated by the press and at meetings was now
general. Alexander II was hailed as the Tsar of all
Slavs, whereas Europe was fiercely attacked. 80
Such a campaign worried Austria-Hungary, as Andrassy hoped that such
emotions would not engulf the Slavs within the Dual Monarchy.
A new Russian offensive in the Balkans had to wait until September
1877 in order for the troops to regroup. To make sure that they would
succeed in their next attempt, the Tsar's agents had been busy negotiating
79 Stojanovic, 219. This would not be the last time when a joint AngloAustrian action was proposed by England against Russia in 1877-1878.
80
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a military alliance with Rumania. Ever since the start of the war,
Rumania had wanted to participate, but the Tsar had shunned all
proposals for such an alliance, as he had not wanted any obstacles in the
way of obtaining the Rumanian territory of Bessarabia. But officials in
Bucharest knew of Russia's desire for Bessarabia, even though the
Russians had never openly expressed these desires. This situation "caught
the Russian diplomats in a most difficult dilemma. They needed
Rumanian cooperation in any military advance against the Turks, but they
also wanted a part of Rumania's territory."81 A convention had already
been signed in April, 1877, which included the Russian pledge "to preserve
and defend the then territorial integrity of Rumania."82 But the agreement
never included Rumanian participation in the war on the side of Russia.
However, after the loss at Plevna, the Tsar, needing more troops, offered
Prince Charles of Rumania the command of military operations. Charles
accepted this post, and abandoned "his previous demand for action. It
should be noted that he also did not use the opportunity afforded by the
Russian embarrassment to gain precise advantages [Bessarabia] for his
country. "83
With the addition of Rumanian troops, Russian forces again besieged
Plevna. Despite another strong Turkish defense, the Sultan's armies were
81 Jelavich, "Southern Bessarabia ... ," 204.
82 R. Rosetti, "Rumania's Share in the War of 1877," ~Slavonic

.and E1W European Reyiew 8 (1929/1930): 550-551. This agreement also

allowed free passage of Russian troops, which was necessary for the
initiation of the war. Consult this article for the full explanation of the
Russian-Rumanian Convention of April 1877.
83 Jelavich, "Southern Bessarabia ... ," 216.
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badly defeated in late November, 1877. This sealed the fate of the Turkish
cause. "The Russian army now pushed on at once to Adrianople ... there
was no longer any Turkish army worthy of opposing Russia's march."84
By January 1878, Tsarist troops had advanced practically unopposed all the
way to Adrianople. This stirred Britain into action, as the fleet was ordered
to go through the Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmora on January 23.
In an effort to calm London, Russia signed an armistice with the Sultan in
Adrianople on January 31. Even this did not fully quiet England, as
parliament appropriated six million pounds for military preparations in
early February, and
for two months thereafter, there was a clear likelihood of
war between Britain and Russia. Much hinged on the
outcome of the Russo-Turkish negotiations [for peace]
and on the Russian troop movement in the neighborhood
of Constantinople. 85
The Tsar countered the movement of the British fleet by sending his
troops to the town of San Stefano, about eight miles from Constantinople.
Finally, within sight of the Holy City of Eastern Orthodoxy and St. Sophia
Cathedral, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878, signifying the official end to the almost
year-long war.
Basically, the Treat of San Stefano's
most important feature was the creation of a new large
Bulgarian state, larger than that of the Constantinople
Conference, and possessing [an] Aegean Sea coast... .In
addition, San Stefano proposed an increase in territory
for Montenegro and for Serbia, which was also to become
84 Rupp, 216.
85 Clayton, 141-142.
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totally independent, as was Rumania. Rumania was to
cede Southern Bessarabia to Russia, and to receive in
compensation the Dobrudja region. In Asia, Kars,
Batum, Ardahan and Bayazid were to become Russian;
and Turkey was to pay a large indemnity.86
But the treaty also
corresponded to two fundamental tendencies of Russian
policy: it satisfied the Slavophils, who desired to see as
many Slavs as possible liberated; it ... established her
domination over the Straits and expelled Austria from
the Balkan peninsula.87
The author of the treaty was the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople,
General Count Nicholas Ignatiev. The general had been at Constantinople
since 1861, and had served Russia there in many capacities. From the very
first, he was an ardent Pan-Slavist, as he "saw in the Slavophile movement
only an expression of national self-consciousness and looked on all Slavs
outside of Russia as natural allies against the increasing aggressiveness of
the regenerated Teutons."88 Before 1878, the Tsar was reluctant to promote
many Pan-Slavists to his staff, as this would only add extra pressure on
him to embark on an extremely adventurous foreign policy in the name of
Pan-Slavism. But the fact that Ignatiev was chosen to negotiate this treaty
gave the Pan-Slavists hopes that the Tsar was coming more under their
persuasion. The terms of this treaty reflected Ignatiev's definite Pan-

86 Ibid., 143-144. The indemnity amounted to about one-point-four
billion rubles, an enormous sum, but it was designed to rectify Russia's
dire financial straits after the war. Again, there are more specific terms of
the treaty not explained here.
87 Stojanovic, 233.
88 Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "General Count N. P. Ignatiev and the PanSlav Movement," Journal Qf Central European Affairs 17, no. 3 (October
1957): 255.
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Slavist beliefs, and for this reason, San Stefano has been called "the climax
of his diplomatic career."89
But while the Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavs were jubilant for
the treaty, reaction abroad was stem and swift. For one,
these terms, which gave Russia apparent predominance
in the Balkans and a strong position in Asia, were in
flagrant contradiction with other European treaties,
notably the Treaty of Paris and the Reichstadt and
Budapest Agreements.90
Beyond just the legal aspects, the peace treaty really threatened England's
and Austria's vital interests. The establishment of a large Bulgaria
(designed to be a Russian satellite) with access to the Aegean Sea would
mean the emergence of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean Sea,
potentially threatening passages to India through both the Straits and the
Suez Canal. Though the Straits to the Black Sea did not provide a direct
path to India, the eastern shores of the Black Sea placed one in close
proximity of the Persian Gulf and India by a land and river route. So if the
Russians controlled the Black Sea, then this would cut the British off from
using this possible path towards India. Also, the British thought that the
treaty put Russia in such a dominating position over Turkey, that the
Sultan's actual independence would be virtually non-existent, leaving him
constantly subject to blackmail.
For the Dual Monarchy, the creation of a large Slavic state, though
not actually touching her borders, was feared, and was also regarded as a
violation of their agreements with Russia, especially the recent one signed
89 Clayton, 144.
90 Jelavich, Th.e. Ottoman Empire ... , 111.
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at Budapest. Thus, "both Austria-Hungary and Britain were now pressing
for a fundamental revision of San Stefano, and in Britain's case, there was
a clear warning that war might follow unless the Russians agreed to a
conference. "91
To show that they meant business, the British fleet remained in the
Sea of Marmara, within firing range of the Russian force, which was
encamped in the town of San Stefano. England intended to remain there
until a satisfactory arrangement was made for a conference. In the
meantime, tensions remained very high as each side waited for the other to
make a move. It was here that the German Chancellor Bismarck took the
lead in working on a peaceful arrangement between England and Russia.
Bismarck increasingly recognized that he needed to prevent a general
European war, as he feared that Germany would become involved, even if it
really did not want to do so. While the two forces confronted each other,
Bismarck contacted both sides in order to familiarize himself with each
party's ideas, and then work for a compromise. In order to assert his own
position, Bismarck, in a speech to the Reichstag on February 19, 1878,
"announced that Germany sought only to be the 'honest broker'," thus
presenting himself as a neutral mediator in Balkan affairs.92 But the
situation was still very tense, as both England and Austria discussed
military preparations and an alliance.
A conference to solve the problem was first proposed by Austrian
Foreign Minister Andrassy, but the Russians refused his suggestion it be
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held in Vienna, as they knew that a meeting held in the Habsburg capital
could provide Austria-Hungary with possible advantages in any

negotiations. Finally, in early March 1878, Russian Foreign Minister
Gorchakov proposed a Congress to be held in Berlin. The other powers
agreed, though
Germany and England accepted Berlin with some
reluctance. Bismarck disliked being compelled to take a
more active part in the settlement of peace than he
wished to; England feared lest it might lead to a more
intimate cooperation between the three Northern
Powers.93
The powers agreed to the Congress only if it limited itself to the issues dealt
with in the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russo-Turkish War, "excluding
from it, Egypt, Syria, and the Far East and some others."94
Russia was still very reluctant to see the entire treaty shelved by a
Congress, and Gorchakov soon appeared to want to distance himself from
his own proposal for a meeting. In the meantime, the three major parties,
England, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, continued to place proposals and
positions before each other, while military preparations also went on until
late May. The Tsar soon realized that Russia was completely isolated, and
that it was in no position to fight a war, as its military and finances were
exhausted. Using Bismarck as a middleman, England and Russia decided
to negotiate the issues and resolve their differences prior to the forthcoming
Congress. Lord Salisbury represented England in these negotiations. He

93 Stojanovic, 235.
94 Ibid., 236. This was the demand made by France, which was
accepted by the other powers as a condition for a Congress.
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had recently become foreign secretary following the resignation of Lord
Derby, who had lost his credibility after the Treaty of San Stefano.
Thus, in a May 30th protocol, Russia's Asian conquests were
restored to Turkey, except for Batum and Kars. Also, Bulgaria was divided
into two parts by the line at the Balkan Mountains, as the agreement made
at the Constantinople Conference had recommended. "In return, England
consented, though with reluctance, to Russia's taking Bessarabia, and
promised not to contest the other clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano."95
This protocol was quickly followed by an agreement between Britain
and Turkey. Since Russia was to retain Batum and Kars, England did not
feel completely safe from the risk of another Russian invasion into Turkish
Asia or Persia. Accordingly, Turkey and England signed the Cyprus
'

Convention of June 4, 1878. In this agreement,
the British government would defend by force of arms
the Sultan's Asiatic dominions, as demarcated by the
Congress, against any fresh Russian attack. In order to
be in a position to execute this engagement, the English
were to be allowed to occupy a~d administer the island of
Cyprus, paying annually to the Sultan.96
This brought about a desired outcome for England, because as their empire
expanded in Africa and Asia in the 1870's, there had been shown
the need to acquire a port either in the Black Sea or in
the Eastern Mediterranean which would provide Great
Britain with a naval base closer to Suez and the Straits

95 Ibid., 255-256. For some specifics on this protocol, consult this
source.
96 Buckle, 298. Again, there are more detailed provisions within this
agreement, and they are explained in this source.
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than Malta ... [and thus], the lines of imperial
communications would be assured.97
The last pre-Congress arrangement came on June 6, 1878, when
"Britain and Austria-Hungary made a preliminary agreement concerning
the new Bulgaria and the Austrian position in Bosnia ... [but] common
ground between Britain and Austria-Hungary was limited to Turkey in
Europe."98
Hence, at last, the issues before the Congress were decided upon, and
perhaps more importantly, many problems were solved by the pacts
involving Russia, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. For this
reason, author William Langer pointed out that some historians have said
that "the Congress of Berlin was at bottom a farce, because all the decisions
had been made beforehand."99 However, Langer disagreed with this
opinion. He stated that
Bismarck would have been only too glad if this had been
true ... the agreements made beforehand were all of a
vague nature, and all of the powers chiefly concerned
were determined to get what they could out of the
Congress.100
This is a crucial element to keep in mind for the Congress of Berlin, as it
seems to have been a commonly held attitude, especially by Russia. Despite
all of the preliminary agreements that it had with England and AustriaJelavich, ~Ottoman Empire ... , 113. Many historians treat the
Cyprus Convention as a separate matter from the Congress. A special
monograph has been written on it: Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and~
Cn>rus Convention Policy Qf .18..'.ra (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1934).
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Hungary, the Tsar still wanted the most out of the Congress that he could
get, and he looked to Germany to help him achieve it. In his view,
Germany owed Russia a favor for staying neutral in Germany's wars of
unification. Now it was time to return those favors. At the same time,
agreements outlying the general focus of a major conference were (and still
are) very common, as it was necessary to limit the discussions to a definite
field, otherwise delegates could force such complicated negotiations, that
the whole meeting would have been in danger of failure. Such high-level
meetings were showcases, where diplomats came in their best possible
positions, while still pursuing an eventual agreement. Thus, with the
stage set, a vast array of distinguished personalities convened in Berlin for
the historic Congress of Berlin.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN OF 1878
The Congress, which convened on June 13, 1878, "was one of the
most brilliant political assemblies of modern times, not unworthy of
comparison with the congresses of Vienna and Paris."101 But unlike these
previous congresses, never before had there been so many nations with the
distinction as a Great Power; and Berlin included dignitaries for peoples
that were not represented at the other meetings.
The British delegation, possibly the most competent of all the groups,
included Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Foreign Secretary Lord Robert
Salisbury, and the English Ambassador to Berlin, Odo Russell. They were
most set on changing the Bulgaria created in the Treaty of San Stefano, and
were even willing to make some minor concessions in Asia to do it. Yet in
many respects, they were in the best position of all the powers, as it was
mostly their determination that brought on the Congress, and also, they
were the most prepared for war.
Russia countered with the veteran Foreign Secretary Alexander
Gorchakov, who was obviously past his prime, not to mention the fact that
he and Bismarck had experienced a strained relationship for several years.
The Russian Ambassador to London, Count Peter Shuvalov, thus, stepped
to the forefront of their delegation. Also, the Ambassador to Germany,

101 Langer, 150.
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Count Paul Oubril, attended, but he made no real contribution. Notice that
Count Ignatiev, the creator of the Treaty of San Stefano, did not come to
Berlin. This showed that even the Russians realized that the treaty "was
the greatest stupidity that we could have made."102 Nevertheless, the
Russians, especially Gorchakov, still hoped that a "Big Bulgaria" could yet
be saved during the meetings.
Austria-Hungry sent a respectable delegation, consisting of Foreign
Minister Andrassy, the Austrian Ambassador to Berlin, Count Alois
Karolyi, and Baron Heinrich Haymerle as an adviser. Their policy was set
on acquiring the Turkish provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they looked
to England and Germany to support their cause.
Although France swallowed its pride by coming to Berlin for such a
meeting, it sent her Foreign Minister, William Waddington and her
ambassador to Germany Count Saint-Vallier, and Despres as an adviser.
The French took a very cautious course in Berlin, and saw themselves as a
second mediator to Germany.
Meanwhile, Italy was represented by Foreign Minister Lodovico
Corti, an experienced diplomat, and Count de Launay, the Italian
ambassador to Berlin. The Italians hopes to show their new strength by
gaining some kind of prize in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, and
mostly followed Britain's lead to do so.
The Turks sent delegates as well, yet they did not bother to send a
strong contingent to a meeting that would prove to be a humiliation. Their

102 Medlicott, The Con~ess Qf Berlin ... , 40. This was a statement
that Shuvalov made before the Congress met.
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main goal was to leave Berlin as little damaged as possible, and they, too,
looked to England for help.
The small Balkan states also sent representatives, none of whom are
important enough to name, primarily because they came as observers who
could make appeals and suggestions, but they did not have real voting
power. On a whole, "nationality as a principle found little, if any, sincere
support from the Great Powers."103 Instead, political and strategical
considerations were given top priority.
Although the German delegation included their Foreign Secretary
von Bernhard Bulow and the Ambassador to Paris, Prince Chlodwig
Hohenlohe, there was no doubt that Bismarck was definitely the dominant
member of this contingent, and, in fact, of the whole Congress. Knowing
his expertise, the representatives quickly elected him as president of the
Congress, even though this created a situation the chancellor wanted to
avoid. He knew that both Russia and Austria expected him to vote for their
side, and he did not want to be placed in that dilemma in the presence of all
the other diplomats. In order to avoid this, he even suggested that French
Foreign Minister Waddington be elected as president of the proceedings.
Somehow, Bismarck needed to bring the Congress to a successful
conclusion, and at the same time, satisfy all of the participants. This was
especially the case with Russia and Austria-Hungary, since Bismarck
wanted to maintain the Three Emperors' League. In nominating
Waddington, the German chancellor tried to put France in a place of
responsibility, especially if either of the other Northern Powers' goals failed
103 Henry F. Munro,~ Berlin Congress (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1918), 30.
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to be realized. However, the delegates did not want it, and Bismarck
became president of the Congress. His role became crucial in making the
meeting a success. In all, "twenty representatives ... participated, three
from each of the powers invited, save Italy, which sent only two."104
Despite all of the preliminary agreements, the Congress' main goal
was still to change the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano, and "to secure in
the interests of European peace, the creation of a reorganized Turkish
Empire which should depart from the status quo ... as little as possible."105
However, since there were many questions to resolve in the treaty
concerning Europe and Asia Minor, which ones would get priority?
Bismarck answered this in short order, as he saw Europe in a very tense
situation. He took the initiative with the statement, "let us deal with the
great things that concern England, for England is quite ready to go to war
with Russia."106 No one could deny this, and so at only the second meeting
of the Congress, the delegates moved to resolve the most pressing issue
first, the "Big Bulgaria" created at San Stefano."107
The "Big Bulgaria" consisted of many problems, especially in the
opinion of England and Austria-Hungary. The new Bulgarian coastline
touched both the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, and since the new nation
would presumably be a Russian satellite, this would allow the Russians to
104 Ibid., 8.
105 Medlicott, The
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avoid the Straits into the Black Sea, and give the Tsar's navy direct access to
the Mediterranean Sea by using Bulgarian ports. This would solve the
long-standing problem of the Russian Navy being bottled up in the Black
Sea. But as long as the British controlled the Straits and the Mediterranean
Sea, they could not allow the Russians to pose such a threat. Allowing the
Russians a port in the Aegean Sea also would endanger England's route to
India, as Russia could conceivably blockade both the Straits and the Suez
Canal. Naval concerns were not the only problem involved in the "Big
Bulgaria." Her new borders included many peoples besides Bulgarians.
Greeks, Turks, and other Slavic peoples would find themselves inside the
new state, mostly against their will. Western Europeans attached special
significance to the Greeks, because of their cultural and historical
importance and, thus, did not want them included in the projected borders.
Likewise, the nationality problem was of great concern to AustriaHungary, since the new Bulgaria represented the realization of the large
Slavic state which they so dreaded. Andrassy argued that the "Big
Bulgaria" violated the Budapest Agreement of 1877, in which Russia had
promised not to create such a large Slavic state. Britain also stipulated that
these new borders would threaten the Ottoman Empire, reducing it to a
puppet state of St. Petersburg. With most of the other powers agreeing with
these criticisms, Russia had little chance of maintaining its dream of a
"Big Bulgaria." In fact, all the Great Powers followed England's lead on
the Bulgarian issue. Even the Balkan representatives at the Congress did
not support the "Big Bulgaria," because the proposed state included lands
which the other Balkan states also wanted.
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Thus, the discussions turned to redrawing the Bulgarian border at
the Balkan Mountains, with the Sultan maintaining political and military
control of the southern province (East Roumelia), a system adopted at the
Constantinople Conference. However, the situation had changed, as the
Russians had just won a costly war, and for that reason, the Russian
delegation at first refused to consider a small state. They also did not want
the Turks to regain East Roumelia, even if the area was to be autonomous.
Thus, when Shuvalov sent the new proposals to the Tsar for consideration,
the British made arrangements for a special train to take the English
delegation home on June 21. Bismarck intervened here, as he saw the
Congress collapsing before his eyes. In order to save the Congress,
Bismarck had dinner that night with Prime Minister Disraeli, and they
discussed both British demands and possible concessions. Later, with
French mediation, it was decided "that the Sultan might garrison troops on
the frontier between East Roumelia and Bulgaria, but not billet them on the
population ... [and] The Russian occupation of Bulgaria was to be limited to
nine months."108
This agreement then helped solve several related problems at the
same time. While the smaller Bulgaria was to receive independence, the
Sultan received political and military control over Eastern Roumelia under
four main conditions, though that province was also to exercise a great deal
of autonomy.109 Russian troops were to help establish a new government in
108 Langer, 155.
109 Medlicott, Conruss 2fBerlin ... , 56. The Sultan was given very
strict guidelines on how he could use his troops here, including the
requirement of informing the Great Powers when he chose to do so. See the
limitations cited here.
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Bulgaria, and eventually in April, 1879, the Bulgarian Assembly elected as
their hereditary prince, Alexander of Battenberg. For
the Treaty of Berlin had excluded from the throne
members of the Russian ruling family, but ... he
[Alexander of Battenberg] was a German prince, his
father had served in both the Russian and Austrian
armies, and he was related by marriage to the English
royal family. In short, his election could be counted
upon to win general approval.110
However, the Russians soon became disenchanted with the prince, as he
pursued a foreign policy very different from that of the Tsar, and before
long, Russian officials looked for ways to remove him from office.
As for the rest of the Bulgarian settlement at Berlin, the Turks were
given permission to fortify the border on the southern side of the Balkan
Mountains for necessary security. This breakthrough still left the borders
"in somewhat vague terms, it was agreed that it [the borders] should be left
to a technical commission which was to base its decisions primarily on
strategic and geographical considerations."111 Later, as the Congress
neared an end, the representatives accepted the borders as suggested by the
commission. The division of Bulgaria into two parts and the decision on its
government was a great victory for England which received aid in this, as
"Andrassy's vigorous and consistent support of the British was ... the
decisive factor in the situation."112 However, there was a price for this
support, namely that England would support Austria-Hungary's desire to

110 Langer, 336.
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occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina. These provinces became the next question to
be considered by the Congress.
Since the start of the Balkan uprisings in 1875, the Dual Monarchy
had become increasingly interested in acquiring these two Turkish
provinces to the south. Andrassy had been long reluctant to do so, as this
would only have brought more Slavs into the monarchy, something which
he and his fellow Hungarians did not really want. But after the Turk's
decisive loss to Russia in 1878, there was no longer any hope of the Sultan
maintaining his hold on either province. This meant that either AustriaHungary would gain Bosnia-Herzegovina, or they would be divided up
between Serbia and Montenegro. The latter was not acceptable for
Andrassy. He still looked for a way to secure the regions without outright
annexation. In the time preceding the Congress, Andrassy had
approached the British with the idea of establishing a military occupation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since the Dual Monarchy supported
England's proposals on Bulgaria, this seemed a reasonable trade.
Moreover, both the Sultan and the Tsar could approve an occupation of the
two provinces, because an occupation was not as definite and final as an
outright annexation. Thus, on June 28th, it was Salisbury who proposed
the occupation idea, after Andrassy had described the bad conditions in the
provinces.
However, both Turkey and Russia resisted the proposal. The Turks
were still opposed to any further loss of territory, no matter how it was
done. Salisbury himself "described the occupation as a 'left-handed
annexation'."113 The Turkish refusal on this matter continued until July
113 Ibid., 83.
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13, when Andrassy secretly declared "that the occupation would only be
temporary, and expressly reserving legal sovereignty over the provinces to
the Sultan ... the final details were reserved for a separate Austro-Turkish
agreement."114 Such an agreement did not actually come until April, 1879.
Russia was equally interested in the territorial settlement in
neighboring Montenegro. Shuvalov "emphasized the great importance
which Russia attached to a satisfactory solution of this question."115 This
attitude actually showed the difficult position into which the Russians had
brought themselves. The Treaty of San Stefano had not only caused united
opposition from the west, but also most of the Balkan peoples resented it.
While Russia had spoken eloquently in past years about Slavic unity, the
borders drawn at San Stefano satisfied the Russians, but only aroused
mistrust among the Slavs. Too many people would end up in a country
with a different nationality, and, small Slavic nations feared the large and
possibly ambitious Bulgaria that Russia wanted to create. After the Treaty
of San Stefano, all the Slavic nations but Bulgaria and Montenegro looked to
the west for protection. Russian officials realized this, and put special
emphasis on helping the cause of Montenegro. In order to win Russia's
approval of Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro was
allowed to win some concessions. However, even the settlement in
Montenegro had to please the Dual Monarchy.
Montenegro had secured the recognition of her
independence and a few miles of coastline, but was not
allowed to have vessels of war ... and [they] had to
114 Bridge, 92-93.
115 Medlicott, The
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surrender the greater part of the territory allotted to her
by the San Stefano Treaty.116
Also, the Austrians proposed to place an army garrison in the
Sandjak region. "The Sandjak was to Bosnia and the Herzegovina what the
Straits were to the Black Sea: a gateway to the east which must be kept
open."117 The Sandjak was vital for communications between the Dual
Monarchy and the two occupied provinces. If the region fell to a Slavic
state, the Habsburg armies would be in potentially serious danger. This
region, too, was included as an area for Austro-Hungarian occupation.
The Congress of Berlin also dealt with problems affecting many other
nations of Southeastern Europe. One of the tragic but realistic decisions
made at the meeting concerned Rumania and the region of Bessarabia. No
one could doubt the Rumanian contribution to the Russian victory over the
Turks, especially in the November 1877 campaign at Plevna, where extra
Rumanian forces helped the Russians break the determined resistance of
the entrenched Turkish forces. In fact, the Rumanians declared
independence in May, 1877, and "although _the move was greeted with great
enthusiasm within the country, it received a negative reception abroad."118
Their declaration of independence was not recognized by anyone, for the
western powers knew that then the war started, that Russia would most
want to gain Bessarabia as compensation. And yet if the province fell

116 Ibid., 96-97.
117 Bridge, 97. Included in the garrison was the entire area known
as the Sandjak of Novibazar, an important passage in the Balkan
Mountains, which was necessary for an army to maintain while in BosniaHerzegovina.
118 Jelavich, "Russia and ... Southern Bessarabia ... ": 215.
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under Russian control, the Tsar would be pleased and the west would not be
threatened. If the powers had recognized Rumanian independence, then
the Russians could not have obtained Bessarabia from the Sultan, since it
was actually Rumanian territory. Then if the Russians occupied Rumania
in order to finally obtain Bessarabia, how would the Great Powers be able to
help them other than through war? No power was willing to go to war to
protect Ru.mania. Finally, at the Congress itself, the Rumanian
representatives, Bratianu and Kogalniceaneu, pleaded their case. Though
they found sympathy, no one was willing to support them, mainly because
of the problems surrounding Bessarabia. Perhaps this decision, more than
any other, showed that the delegates at the Congress had adopted
Bismarck's plan of partitioning the Ottoman Empire between the powers,
in order to satisfy the Great Powers and avoid a possible war. Concessions
for nationalism did not fit into Bismarck's partition plan. This is another
example of Bismarck's habit of practicing the power politics involved in
Realpolitik, which, in his mind, only included the Great Powers as
noteworthy for consideration.
So while the Russians finally realized their long dream of
reacquiring the strategic and lush region of Bessarabia, the Congress
looked for ways to soothe Rumanian disappointment. Therefore, in
compensation for the loss of Bessarabia, the Rumanians obtained
recognition of their independence and the region of Dobrudja, a strip of land
south of Bessarabia. However, there was little comparison between the two
regions, as Bessarabia was an area of rich soil bordering part of the Danube
River, while Dobrudja had little if any value. Nonetheless, the Rumanians
had to accept what they were offered, but after this experience, "distrust [of
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Russia] became the foundation of Rumania's foreign policy in the following
decades." 1 19
While Montenegro received small gains along the Adriatic coastline,
some adjustments to Serbia's borders were also made, though far less than
they would have obtained from the Treaty of San Stefano. However, both
states were granted outright independence, and were no longer required to
pay tribute to the Sultan. Meanwhile, Greece acquired some regions in
Macedonia that were not granted to Bulgaria. Therefore, while the small
Balkan states did gain some territories at the Congress of Berlin, it was for
the most part less than they would have received by the San Stefano Treaty.
At the same time, the Balkan states were generally pleased with their
treatment at Berlin, while some had actually been outraged at the Russians
for their treatment at San Stefano. The diplomatic reversal tended to create
strong relationships between most of the Balkan states with the western
powers, at least on a temporary basis.
The fact that Russia acquired the strategic province of Bessarabia
raised the problem of controlling the mouth of the Danube River. This was
a serious problem, especially for Austria-Hungary, which depended on the
Danube River for much of its commerce. Needless to say, the control of the
river had important military implications as well. As long as the Turks
controlled the mouth of the Danube, and as long as the Habsburgs had good
relations with them, the Danube was considered safe. However, with
Russia in control of the river's mouth, a new system was necessary that
could satisfy everyone.
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Instead of placing the river under the domination of one country, the
Danube was made neutral below the Iron Gates. To govern the river, a
European Commission, created in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was
reestablished, this time composed of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and
Rumania. The Dual Monarchy was given the authority to assume the
responsibilities of maintaining the Iron Gates, keeping the river navigable,
and collecting tolls from all ships at the Gates. Eventually, this European
Commission was made a permanent body in 1883. "The settlement was
thus a Habsburg victory throughout."120
A British-Russian confrontation resurfaced at the Congress
concerning the control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which connect the
Black and Mediterranean Seas. For centuries, Russia desired to have the
Straits, but always had been denied that wish in some way or another.
Great Britain had usually been the main force behind the protection of the
Straits. In 1878, Russia had come very close to capturing the city of
Constantinople, and with it, the strategic Straits. But after the "Big
Bulgaria" was lost at the Congress, and with it, Russia's bid to control the
Straits, the Russian delegation at first pressed for the Straits to be opened to
all warships. However, this would have actually been detrimental for the
Tsar, because the British could come in and threaten Russia's Black Sea
fleet and cities. British dominance of the seas was well known, and on the
other hand, between 1856 and 1871, the Russians had not been able to
station a fleet in the Black Sea, so the Tsar's naval presence there in 1878
was still small. Hence, the Russians soon realized that leaving the Straits
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closed to all warships at least secured the Russian position on a short term
basis. Therefore, on July 11, Shuvalov agreed that "the closure of the
Straits is a European principle, and that the stipulations laid down in this
matter in 1841, 1856, and 1871, now confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, are
obligatory upon all the powers."121 And so with this decision, the control of
the Straits remained with the status quo: in the hands of the Turks, and
with no advantage to any one power.
Another difference between Russia and Great Britain concerned
some of the regions and cities in Asia Minor that Russian armies had
conquered in the Russo-Turkish War. The fact that Russian territory and
influence was growing ever southward concerned the English, who knew
that Russia desired to have access to Persia and the Persian Gulf, in order
to obtain a warm water port. This would be especially important if the Tsar
was unable to gain control of the Straits into the Black Sea. The possibility
of the Russians acquiring a Persian Gulf port would seriously threaten
Britain's position in India, and would surround the Ottoman Empire in a
vise. Though this was still only a possibility, when the Tsar moved into
some key positions along the Black Sea and into Northern Armenia, it was
a sure sign of his long-term intentions. The most important city that the
Tsar claimed was Batum, a crucial city on the Black Sea, especially if it
were used to its military potential.
However, the British delegates recognized that they had already
received nearly every demand that they desired from the Congress, and
they were "willing to admit that the acquisition of Batum... did not
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constitute in itself an adequate ground for war." 122 This was especially the
case, since the Straits had been secured. Thus, a compromise was reached
concerning Batum. Russia was allowed to keep the city of Ba tum, but it
was "to be free and exclusively commercial."123 In this manner, the
Russians would be satisfied in gaining Batum, but in having it, the city
would not prove to be of a military danger to England's position in India.
And along with Batum, Russia also gained Kars and Ardohan in Armenia,
without any restrictions.
As an added measure of insurance against Russian advances, the
British came to a conclusive agreement for the acquisition of the island of
Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. This gave England more credibility
in its claim to protect the Turks from further threats. That is, the Sultan
would have a firmer control of a smaller region, which would seemingly be
better than only weak control of a vast unstable empire.
The only other area that the Congress touched upon was Tunis, as it
appeared that since the British had acquired the controlling shares of the
Suez Canal in 1875, then Egypt would soon become part of the British
Empire. The French were not too pleased with this prospect, especially
since they helped finance the canal. So, "Bismarck... apparently suggested
to the English the possibility of squaring the French by leaving them a free
hand in Tunis ...Waddington returned to Paris contented to have Tunis in
his pocket."124 Though no formal arrangement was made at Berlin
122 Medlicott, Con2'feSs .Qf Berlin ... , 105-106.
123 Buckle, 338.
124 Langer, 160.
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concerning Tunis, France was convinced that the area would soon be
theirs. Since Tunis was to be assigned to France, this meant that the
Italians' best hope of gaining something at Berlin came to naught.
At last, on July 13, 1878, with all of the delegates in full dress
uniforms, the Treaty of Berlin was signed. Overall, the Congress of Berlin
had achieved its goals. On a short term basis, the Congress had stopped an
impending war between Russia and Great Britain. Also, the meeting had
altered the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano, and thereby stopping Russia's
attempt to decide the Eastern Question unilaterally.
In looking at the decisions made at Berlin, especially the division of
Bulgaria, the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, limited gains by
the Tsar and the Balkan states, combined with the English occupation of
Cyprus, "The Congress of Berlin was humiliating and disastrous [for
Russia]. It really appeared that Russia had fought a great and difficult war
in order to secure advantages for Austria and England. "125 In short,
"Russian diplomacy had nothing to show but the retrocession of Southern
Bessarabia and the acquisition of a strip of Armenia in return for a costly
campaign."126 These facts were reflected by the reception that the
diplomats received at home.
Two days after the treaty was signed "the British plenipotentaries
returned to London where a triumphant reception awaited them. Prime
Minister Disraeli declared that he had brought back "Peace with
Honor'. "127 Turkey had once again been put on an apparently firm footing.
125 Ibid., 163.
126 Ibid., 163.
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Moreover, the British had denied the Three Emperors' League the
opportunity of solving the Eastern Question alone. No doubt now existed
that any serious alteration of the situation in the Balkans had to be
approved in London as well. In fact, "whereas the Congress of Paris [1856]
had destroyed 'The Crimean Coalition', the Congress of Berlin almost
recreated it."128 The disastrous impact that the Congress had on the
Dreikaiserbund was exactly what Disraeli hoped for. Since the Berlin
Memorandum of 1876, the prime minister had looked for ways to lessen the
effectiveness of the alliance, and if possible, to put its partners at odds with
one another. Later, Disraeli wrote
next to making a tolerable settlement for the Porte
[Sultan], our great objective was to break up, and
permanently prevent, the alliance of the three empires,
and I maintain there never was a general diplomatic
result more completely effected.129
On the negative side
the resounding achievement of 1878 weakened the
effectiveness of British policy in the long run; for it led
the English public to believe that they could play a great
role without expense or exertion ... [or] without finding
an ally.130
Of course this effect on English attitudes would not be known for several
years. So for a period immediately after the Congress, the meeting was
undoubtedly judged a great success for Great Britain.

128 Taylor, 258.
129 Buckle, 367. The Prime Minister made this comment in a letter
written in November 1880.
1ao Taylor, 250.
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Austria-Hungary also came out of the Congress in a strengthened
position, as it gained the right to occupy the two desired provinces, as well
as being granted a strong voice on the control of the Danube River,
especially at the Iron Gates. Nevertheless, Andrassy received much
criticism at home.
Although the treaty was ultimately ratified, the
campaign [in Austria-Hungary] against Andrassy in
the press, the court, and in both parliaments finally
made his position untenable. Opposition to his foreign
policy was particularly strong in Hungary, when the
occupation was objected to ... [because it] was believed [it]
would accrue to the Slav element in the empire.131
On top of this, the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not handled with
great efficiency, despite coming to a full agreement on the occupation with
the Sultan in April, 1879. Habsburg armies were met with resistance, and
this caused Austro-Turkish relations to suffer. With the additional Slavs
now coming under Habsburg control, "both German and Magyars saw only
the potential threat to their predominance within the Dualist
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structure."132 Eventually, all of these critidsm pushed Andrassy to resign
his post as Austrian Foreign Minister in August, 1879.
For Bismarck, the Congress went about as well as could be expected.
He worked hard to keep the meeting from falling apart, and he was given
credit by the other diplomats for running the sessions in a speedy and
business-like manner.133 Furthermore, his idea of partitioning the
Ottoman Empire was adopted by the other powers as a way to end the state
131 Medlicott, 263.
132 Bridge, 98.
133 Cecil, 295.
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of anarchy that had persisted in many parts of the Empire, and the
partition was seen as a method of preserving European peace. Bismarck
strongly believed that he did the best he could by securing for the other
members of the Dreikaiserbund their most fundamental goals at the
Congress. He knew that Russia had to have Bessarabia, some gains in
Armenia, and the creation of at least some sort of Bulgaria. At the same
time, he was also aware that Austria-Hungary needed to prevent a
dangerous situation from developing in the Balkans. In principle, he was
exactly right, but, perhaps, he did not fully comprehend the true feelings of
the others, especially Russia. Instead of looking at what they received, the
Tsar, Gorchakov, and the Pan-Slavs saw only what they did not get. It was
this group who felt that their costly war against Turkey had gained more
for England and the Dual Monarchy than themselves. In looking for
reasons for this outcome, Gorchakov put the blame on Bismarck, claiming
Bismarck had backed Austria-Hungary on all the important issues.
However, in looking at the decisions made at the Congress, it appears that
Russia received about as much as was possible. For "Russia was also
negotiating on the assumption that she could not resort to war, and
Bismarck was quite prepared to give her the full benefit of his diplomatic
skill and influence."134 The whole point behind Bismarck's policy of
partitioning Turkey was to divide it in an equal fashion, and not give any
one country a dominant position. In fact, that was the whole idea behind
the need to change the unrealistic Treaty of San Stefano. If Russia intended
to try to get any more than she did at Berlin, then she would have had to do
it through war with Britain and, probably, Austria-Hungary (perhaps even
134 Medlicott, ~ Con~ess Qf Berlin ... , 127-128.
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against some other countries such as Italy). No one, not even Bismarck,
could have obtained more for Russia than they received peacefully in the
Treaty of Berlin. If Bismarck had pushed for any more, it would have made
him appear biased towards Russia, and probably isolated Germany with
Russia. This was the last thing that Bismarck wanted to do. Instead,
Bismarck was strongly convinced that he got what he could for the Tsar,
and even if he had pressed for more, it certainly would have been turned
down by the other powers at the Congress.
The important point is, however, that this was not how the Tsar and
many other top Russian officials saw it. They were very displeased by the
outcome at Berlin. Perhaps, as we shall see, that it was this attitude that
changed the course of history.

CHAPTER VI
REACTION TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN
AND THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE
Though Russian officials knew before the Congress that the San
Stefano pact could not be saved, and though they had made agreements
with England and Austria-Hungary before the Congress on border
compromises, many Russians, especially those who harbored Pan-Slavic
ideals, thought that Russia had been humiliated at Berlin by their supposed
friend. Russians saw that "Bismarck started by backing Austria wholeheartedly at the Berlin Congress, meeting all her demands ... where Russia
had spent thousands of lives and millions of pounds, Austria spent only ink
and paper. "135 In reality,
the [Russian] diplomats, who were anxious to exonerate
themselves of responsibility, found it much more
convenient to lay the blame on Bismarck, who owed
Russia so much and had done so little to help her
out... [so that] the Tsar was convinced that the whole
meeting had been 'a European coalition against Russia
under the leadership of Prince Bismarck.'136
This attitude went beyond limited Russian government circles. Later, the
Paris correspondent

for~

London Times wrote an article in November,

1878, entitled: "The Kaiser Has Forgotten His Promise of 1870."137 What the
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136 Langer, 172.
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correspondent was referring to, is the neutral role that Russia played
during the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, which allowed Prussia to
complete German unification. Kaiser Wilhelm I told Tsar Alexander II
that he would never forget this, and implied that Germany would someday
pay her back.138 Thus, in the Tsar's eye, at the time when Russia needed
her most, Germany abandoned her before all the Great Powers to see. The
Tsar did not hold back his anger.
In August 1878, Alexander II sent Wilhelm I two very stem letters.
In these letters, the Tsar complained that despite Russia's long-time
friendship and devotion to Germany, she had not supported Russia at her
time of need, and that now, the Tsar could not guarantee peace between the
two nations.139 In the meantime,
the newspapers of St. Petersburg and Moscow indulged
in violent recriminations with those of Berlin ... [and] in
the reorganization and redistribution of the Russian
armies that followed the war with Turkey, the troops
stationed in Poland were strengthened to an extent that
excited alarm in Germany.140
Bismarck felt suddenly threatened by an angry and emotionally charged
neighbor, one that had tremendous strength. Rumors persisted of a
Russian-French alliance, or a Russian-Italian alliance. This rapidly
developing crisis was critical into pushing Bismarck to what had already

138 Ibid., 251.
139 Ibid., 250-251. This is a paraphrased version of Alexander H's
letters. See this text for the letters in full.
140 Archibald Cary Coolidge, The Ori~ns Qf ~Triple Alliance (New
York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1917), 154-155.
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been proposed--a military alliance between Imperial Germany and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Austrian Foreign Minister Count Julius Andrassy had first formally
proposed such an alliance as early as 1872, and, instead, had to settle for
the much weaker Three Emperors' League between Germany, Russia, and
the Dual Monarchy. Bismarck had declined Andrassy's offer in 1872, as a
military alliance, especially against Russia, was then not necessary for
Germany. However, times had changed, and the Russian reaction to the
outcome at Berlin was indeed very hostile. Secondly, Austrian officials who
were not pleased with Andrassy's performance at Berlin, forced his
resignation. Vienna's pro-German policies, characterized by Andrassy,
seemed threatened. With these factors in mind, a pact with AustriaHungary seemed to Bismarck to ensure close relations with the Dual
Monarchy. Talks began in September, 1879, and before the Austrian
foreign minister's resignation became effective, Bismarck and Andrassy
came to a quick agreement. After only two meetings, the historic pact was
finally signed on October 7, 1879.141
The actual treaty itself was fairly straightforward, as perhaps it
reflected the rapid development of heightened tensions. Written in five
articles, the pact made the following stipulations.142 First, if one of the two

141 This is the date when the pact was given formal approval by the
Kaiser. The actual signing occurred on September 24, and then went
through a review in Berlin, which will be discussed shortly. For more, see
Coolidge, 165-172.
142 Most of my sources have the pact in five articles, although one has
it in three. Perhaps it is just a matter of how the authors divided the
agreement. See Coolidge, 219-221.
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empires were attacked by Russia, then the other party was bound to assist
with a full military force, and the conclusion of peace would come only with
mutual consent. Secondly, if one of the two powers were attacked by
another force, the other party would respect neutrality. However, if that
force was supported by Russia, then the other power would then be required
to assist with a full military force. Also, the treaty was to cover a five-year
period. One year before it was due to expire, the parties would analyze
whether the conditions existed for a renewal. If no formal renewal talks
were held, then the treaty would be considered extended for a three-year
period.143 Furthermore, the treaty was to remain secret, unless mutually
decided upon. However, if Russia were to continue its threatening mood,
then the Tsar was to be warned that an attack on one power was considered
an attack on both. And lastly, the treaty was to be validated by the two
sovereigns, and would be ratified within fourteen days of their
signatures.144 Outside of this, the alliance had two simple objectives, "first,
the defense of the status quo created by the Berlin Congress, and secondly, a
mutual insurance against Russia. "145 Yet it should be noted that while the
specific contents of the treaty were secret, enough information was released
on the treaty so that the Great Powers would generally know that such an
143 "Not until the year 1907 was the special agreement made whereby
it was henceforth to be automatically extended at the end of each three-year
term." Dr. Alfred Franzis Pribam, The Secret Treaties Qf AustriaHungary, 1879-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University,
1920), 7.
144 Ibid., 25-31. The part on guaranteeing neutrality in the face of a
third party invasion was written by Germany, to make sure that Vienna
would not help Paris in case France tried new aggressions.
145 Korff, 95.
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alliance existed between Germany and Austria-Hungary. For the treaty
would not act as a deterrence if the other Great Powers, especially Russia,
did not know something about it. But unknown to the two German empires
at the time,
the Austrian-German Treaty, from October, 1879, to the
outbreak of the World War, [would] constitute the basis
of action of the Central Powers in all questions of foreign
policy, most especially as concerns their relations to
Russia.146
Not even Bismarck could have foreseen in 1879 the treaty's eventual
significance.
The treaty received two completely different reviews within the
German government. Bismarck was very enthusiastic. He was received by
cheering crowds at home and in the Dual Monarchy, as the alliance struck
a very close accord with German nationalists, conservatives, Southern
Germans, and Catholics. Bismarck used this support as an argument for
the 1879 alliance.147 Despite Bismarck's determination to form the
alliance, which will be more fully analyzed later, he received stiff opposition
from Kaiser Wilhelm I.
The Kaiser found it almost impossible to sign a military alliance
against the Tsar, his friend and cousin. The sovereigns had just recently
come together for a meeting on September 3, 1879 in Alexandrovo (in
Russian-controlled Poland) to discuss the tensions and
misunderstandings. With this candid meeting still fresh in his mind,
Wilhelm I believed that a military pact against Russia would be seen as a
146 Pribam, 6.
147 Bismarck, 282.
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betrayal of their September discussions. If there was to be any military
agreement, then it should be three-way alliance with Russia included.
Wilhelm even threatened to abdicate rather than agree to such a pact.
However, Bismarck was just as convinced that the alliance was
justified, and he also threatened to resign. Since the chancellor had played
such a prominent role at the Congress of Berlin, Wilhelm I could ill afford
to have him leave now, and have the complicated Berlin Treaty supervised
by someone who was inexperienced. Furthermore, Bismarck was
supported by all the Kaiser's main diplomatic and military advisers. Even
the Crown-Prince took the chancellor's viewpoint. Under such pressure,
Wilhelm finally, but reluctantly, endorsed the alliance.148 The only
concession that the Kaiser obtained was that the treaty would be secret, and
he would inform the Tsar himself as to the scope of the treaty.149
The reaction of most other powers to the Dual Alliance was very
favorable. British Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, in a speech in
Manchester in October 1879, called the news of the pact "good tidings of
great joy."150 This reflected the anti-Russian feeling that existed in the
west after the Tsar's threatening actions during the Russo-Turkish war,
and later following the Congress of Berlin. This corresponded to
Bismarck's prediction that the alliance would be warmly received,
especially by England, which had very close relations with both Vienna and
148 For reading the discussion on this, see: Bismarck, 285-286.
149 Coolidge, 170-172.
150 Ibid., 173. Perhaps this statement was made because the Dual
Alliance signified an obvious split between the members of the
Preikaiserbund, which was one of Prime Minister Disraeli's major goals
since the start of the Balkan uprisings.
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Berlin. In fact, Austria continuously tried to persuade the British that they
should join the alliance. In the opinion of Heinrich Haymerle (Austrian
Foreign Minister after Andrassy), "a coalition of central powers with
England would maintain peace, for it would be so strong that no other
grouping would dare to challenge it."151 But Bismarck was afraid that
such an alliance would be too threatening to Russia, so "his advice to
Haymerle was to ... do enough to maintain British friendship."152
However, it was not just heightened tensions that pushed Bismarck
to sign the Dual Alliance. After the Congress, Bismarck knew that a pact
of some kind was necessary in order to maintain German security.
Lacking any natural barriers to invasion, Bismarck saw Germany's newlywon position of strength and size as still uncertain. Thus, between the
Berlin Congress and the alliance's approval, he made a very thorough
analysis on his options--should he ally with Russia or Austria?153 Those
were his main choices. What were the advantages and disadvantages of
each? He was well aware of the importance of his decision, for it would
likely signal Germany's direction in foreign affairs for many years to come.
Bismarck gave very serious consideration to creating a military
alliance with Tsarist Russia. In fact, the Russian Ambassador to London,
Count Peter Shuvalov, had proposed such an agreement just before the
Congress of Berlin. Bismarck declined the offer then, and after the
151 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone. and~ Concert .Qf Europe
(London: The Athlone Press, 1956), 43-44.
152 Ibid., 63.
153 The chancellor goes through this review in his memoirs;
Bismarck, 276-282, 286-296.
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Congress, the chancellor maintained the same reasoning for not
combining with Russia.154 From a German point of view in 1879,
Bismarck's judgment was excellent. The chancellor believed that by an
alliance with the larger Russia, Germany would have automatically put
herself in a second-class status to the naturally dominant and rather
adventurous power. Furthermore, the Tsar might use the situation to his
advantage, requiring Germany to join in costly wars in the Balkans,
Persia, or in the Far East, none of which were in Germany's interests.
Furthermore, given Germany's secondary role as an ally, the Tsar might
dissolve the treaty at any time, perhaps even during a war. And since
Russia's relations with the west were not good in 1878, especially with
England and Austria-Hungary, Germany would be in the position of
isolating herself with Russia, giving the Tsar even more power and
influence over Germany. Bismarck knew, too, that a German-Russian
alliance would inevitably be directed against Austria-Hungary, and the
Dual Monarchy would as a consequence be forced to go to France for an
alliance of their own. This possible Paris-Vienna connection, or "Catholic
Coalition" as Bismarck called it, was the chancellor's worst nightmare. It
was not a far-fetched possibility. France and Austria had mutual interests,
for they both might want to settle scores with Germany (for the wars of 1871
and 1866 respectively). Bismarck knew that such an alliance would be a

154 Bismarck, 260. Even after the Congress, Shuvalov was interested
in close ties with Germany, as he did not blame Bismarck for the Berlin
Treaty. However, he was never completely successful in converting Tsar
Alexander II to his viewpoint.
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grave threat, and, as long as this "Catholic Coalition" was possible,
Germany could never feel safe.155
Moreover, Bismarck found Russian political decision-making too
unpredictable, as a growing number of Pan-Slavists, led by the Russian
Ambassador to Constantinople, General Nicholas Ignatiev, were involved.
The Pan-Slavs dreamt of unifying all Slavic people under Russian
leadership, with their further goal of restoring the seat of the Eastern
Orthodox Church to Constantinople, whence it was forced to flee after the
Turks took power. The Pan-Slavs had no love for Germany, and they
certainly wanted to destroy the Dual Monarchy or, at least, liberate the
Slavs from the yoke of Vienna. In fact, "a most characteristic trait of the
Russian Pan-Slav movement; it was prompted much more by hatred of
Germany than by love of Slavs."156 Bismarck's distrust was not
unjustified, as the Pan-Slavs had most strongly pushed for the RussoTurkish War of 1877 and were most upset by the Treaty of Berlin. Besides
these political reservations, Bismarck found the growing revolutionary
movement in Russia as potentially threatening to Germ.any, while at the
same time, possibly making Imperial Russia an unstable ally.
For Bismarck the Tsarist regime was to be retained as a strong
friend within the Three Emperors' League. This way, the "Three Northern
Powers" could work together to maintain conservative principles while also
cooperating to defeat Socialist and Liberal causes. In this way, the Dual
Alliance, in Bismarck's eye, was designed to eventually make the
155 Ibid., 286-287.
156 Korff, 97.
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Dreikaiserbund stronger, possibly even an actual military alliance.
However, this view was not shared by Austria-Hungary. Andrassy "would
not have anything to do with an agreement

'a~·

with Russia. Again,

such a monarchical league would appear to be directed against France." 15 7
Much of Bismarck's rationale for Austria-Hungary was the same as
those in his decision against Russia, only reversed. Since France's defeat
by Prussia in 1871, the Dual Monarchy had become increasingly proGerman. This had been exemplified by their choice of foreign minister in
1871, Count Andrassy. However, Austrian officials were not satisfied with

Andrassy's performance during the Congress of Berlin. A new foreign
minister, Baron Heinrich Haymerle, was named. Haymerle was a
"cautious, unadventurous career diplomat...[and] he was determined to
continue Andrassy's anti-Russian policy."158 Bismarck wanted to
encourage this obvious vote of confidence by allying with the Dual
Monarchy. In this manner, Bismarck kept Vienna in the pro-German
camp, and thus, avoided the "Catholic Coalition" from coming about.
Bismarck was right that the Dual Alliance would appeal to Germans
on both sides of the border. The reception that Bismarck received in both
countries proved the point. However, Bismarck was rarely the sentimental
type. His choice of the Habsburgs as an ally was based on Realpolitik, one of
Bismarck's trademarks.159
157 Bridge, 106.
158 Ibid., 108.
159 Bismarck, 27 4. "The questions of the popularity in Germany and
the Monarchy are for me a secondary importance, and were only further
justifications to consider for the eventual outcome."
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In considering Austria-Hungary, at least since 1875, it was becoming
apparent that
Germany could not afford to see Austria completely
defeated and deprived of her position as a Great Power.
If that were to happen, the Habsburg Empire would
undoubtedly be disrupted, and even if Germany were
strengthened by the acquisition of the German provinces
of the empire, she would find herself alone between the
powerful Tsarist Empire on the one side and a vengeful
France on the other .160
Since Russia posed a threat to Austria-Hungary, Bismarck saw the new
alliance as assuring the government of the Dual Monarchy that it would
have help in the face of a possible Russian attack.1 61 If a Russo-German
alliance had been signed, then the Dual Monarchy would have almost
certainly been partitioned at some time in the future, possibly after a very
bloody war. Bismarck was not interested in such a scenario.
A strong element of Bismarck's reasoning rested on the conviction
that he could use the treaty to restrain Habsburg ambitions. Although
Russian designs in the Balkans were well known, the Dual Monarchy was
not without their own. For Bismarck, his success in foreign policy
"depended on his ability to so direct the Eastern Question as to avoid
collision between Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the
Orient."162 To prevent such a conflict, Bismarck emphasized the alliance's
defensive nature, and that Germany would come to the aid of Austria160

Langer, 175-176.

161 Bismarck, 278. However, this threat seemed more a concern to
Bismarck than to the Habsburgs. Perhaps it is because as early as 1876,
Russia had asked Germany to remain neutral in the event of a RussianAustralian conflict; Bismarck, 242.
162 Andrassy, Bismarck, Andrassy ... , 18.
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Hungary, but not sacrifice Berlin's own interests. Thus, the pact was not a
blank check to allow Habsburg meddling in the Balkans, but rather it was
designed by Bismarck to retain the Dual Monarchy's security and status as
a Great Power. For unlike a German-Russian alliance, any Berlin-Vienna
pact placed Germany as the unquestioned dominant party, a position that
Bismarck relished and one that he was intent on keeping.
Bismarck also saw other uses for the alliance. It was seen as a
"stepping-stone towards a new Three Emperors' League," and before that
came about officially, Russia's isolation would force the Tsar to rely on
Germany as his mediator with other powers.163 The isolation of Russia
would force the Tsar to come to a more realistic assessment of the Treaty of
Berlin, and lead him back into Germany's camp. "Her [Russia's] choice of
allies remained limited. Republican France was unacceptable ... England
as before could not be considered. There remained the two German
courts."164 And as Bismarck envisioned, the Tsar once again did seek
friendship with Berlin.
For the Dual Monarchy, the signing of the Dual Alliance was a
major victory, the accomplishment of a goal which they had first proposed
in the early 1870's. The alliance gave them a strong position, and it boosted
their prestige abroad, which had sagged since their 1866 defeat by Prussia.
Obviously, tying themselves to the German Reich met with a great deal of
163 Bridge, 107.
164 Jelavich, A Century Qf Russian Foreign Policy... , 186. At this
stage, Alexander II could not consider an alliance with France because of
the major ideological differences. This attitude would prevail in St.
Petersburg until 1894, which changed under different circumstances and a
different Tsar, in part due to the need for loans that France supplied.
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enthusiasm, and it proved to the non-Germans of the Monarchy that
Vienna had finally decided to abandon any lingering dreams of becoming
involved again in German politics.
However, there were some differences of interpretation of the treaty
between Berlin and Vienna. Austrian officials thought that the alliance
gave them strength in their Southeast European pursuits rather than
acting as a restraint on them. Furthermore, an obvious pro-Austrian
viewpoint in Berlin implied that it would be a permanent relationship,
making any further close ties between Russia and Germany impossible.
Thus, while Bismarck saw the treaty as the first step towards a closer
Three Emperors' League, Andrassy saw the Dual Alliance as "the
tombstone of the Three Emperors' League."165 This explained Austrian
reluctance to renew the League until 1881, as Austria-Hungary "saw few
advantages for herself in the arrangement."166
Andrassy did obtain a major concession in the alliance before he
agreed to it. Originally, Bismarck had wanted the Dual Alliance directed
against both Russia and France. But "Andrassy had been scrupulously
careful in the negotiations to avoid anything that might cast a cloud over
his relations with London and Paris," and agreeing to a military alliance
against France would have done just that.167 The Dual Monarchy had no
serious quarrel with Paris, and saw no need to create one. This attitude
disturbed Kaiser Wilhelm I. He did not understand why Germany had to
165 Bridge, 107.
166 Jelavich,

A Century Qi' Russian Forei~ Policy... , 187.

167 Bridge, 107.

82

help Austria in case of a Russian attack, but Austria did not have to aid
Germany in case of an attack from France. However, Andrassy did not
agree, and if there were to be an alliance, it "must be clearly directed
against Russia."168 To this, Bismarck finally agreed, but with obvious
disappointment.
The treaty caused the Tsar to discover just how isolated he really
was. In fact
the need for a serious attempt at reconciliation with
Germany had been realized by the Russian government
before it received definite evidence of the AustroHungarian-German rapprochement, ... [and it] supplied
the primary reason for the new phase in Russian
diplomacy.169
The Tsar was aware that historically
the alliance of the three northern courts and the
traditional Russian-Prussian link guaranteed the safety
of the Russian western border,. .. as long as these
agreements held ... Russia was safe from the threat of a
direct invasion by a hostile coalition.170
The Russians now realized that their reaction against the Treaty of
Berlin and Bismarck was unrealistic, and that, it was futile to try to change
the Berlin Treaty. Russia had been terribly weakened by the war with
Turkey both militarily and financially. It was in no position to attack either
Germany or Austria-Germany, especially if England intervened on behalf
of the Dual Alliance. Thus, the Russians were forced to endeavor to
resurrect the Three Emperors' League, an effort which succeeded in 1881.

168 Ibid., 106.
169 Medlicott,
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QfBerlin ... , 385.

170 Jelavich, A Century .Qf Russian Forei~ Policy.. ., 291.

83

A further guarantee of German friendship came with the Reinsurance
Treaty of 1887, which pledged both Germany and Russia to maintain
cordial and peaceful relations. Yet the 1879 treaty had left a permanent
scar on relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, since the treaty was "a
proof that he [Bismarck] had given his preference to Austria; that the
Russians had to assume a permanent anti-Russian bias in his policy as
long as it remained in force. "171 If Bismarck had wanted to show that he
was not pro-Austrian at the Congress of Berlin, then the Dual Alliance
seemed a contradiction. To renew the treaty only reinforced Russian
suspicions of Germany's attitude. It is perhaps true that the initial signing
of the Dual Alliance was not a mistake, as it did bring the Russians back
into the fold. But it seems logical that the renewed Three Emperors'
League in 1881 should have voided the Dual Alliance. How could the Dual
Alliance powers truly have maintained close relations with Russia, if they
also had a major military alliance directed solely at Russia? Few
friendships, no matter their history or close ties, can function in such a
shaky and tense status. Russia either should have been included in the
military agreement in 1881, or there should have been no alliance at all.
Bismarck should have said to Vienna--either you accept a three-way
military agreement with Russia, or there will be no alliance. Germany had
that power, and Austria-Hungary would have been forced into a
compromise. In this manner, no one would have received preferable
treatment. Either both would have been included in the alliance, or none.
But Bismarck was afraid of trying this approach, for fear that Vienna

111
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would ally itself with France instead. Therefore, Bismarck tried to balance
his relations with Vienna, while also maintaining a tense friendship with
Russia. This would not satisfy the Tsar forever.
In other respects, the Dual Alliance represents both the first modem
permanent alliance between two Great Powers, and also significantly, the
longest existing military pact before World War I. Of course, most of these
facts were not realized in 1879, but they must be considered, as "the October
treaty was soon followed by further developments in Bismarck's alliance
system, which defeated William Gladstone's dream of a united Europe."172
This destruction of the Concert of Europe, first created during the Congress
of Vienna of 1815, showed Bismarck's theory on maintaining European
peace. Bismarck's
philosophy of international life remained fundamentally
combative and pessimistic, and he could discover no
reliable basis for national survival other than the
accumulation and maneuvering of superior force.173
In short, the Dual Alliance was the first sign that the peace of Europe
depended on the threat of war, rather than on a mutual and equal
cooperation for peace as envisioned in the Concert of Europe. This
philosophy is the same theoretically as that which has dominated postWorld War II Europe, in the effort to maintain peace on the continent with
the NATO and Warsaw Pact Coalitions, and the threat of "Mutual Assured
Destruction."
And also unknown to Bismarck in 1879, the Dual Alliance would
have eventually become a traditional part of European diplomacy in the
112 Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone, ... , 2.
173 Ibid., 11.
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later Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, since it lasted until 1918.
Especially for Berlin, as the relationship between Germany and AustriaHungary formally set up in the treaty became their most dependable one in
foreign affairs.
A main question still unsolved here is the question whether alliances
necessarily cause counter-alliances. One can not say that it always does,
but the Dual Alliance was unique, in that it was the first pact between two
Great Powers signed in a time of peace. Thus, it can be said that the Dual
Alliance started the pattern of alliances, which
were defensive or deterrent in nature, designed to
supplement one's military power, deter aggression, and
aid in defense in the event the deterrence failed. As in
the Nineteenth Century, military preparedness and
planning in advance were absolutely vital to the
successful conduct of war.174
The rapid victories of Prussia over Austria in 1866 and France in 1871
showed that no longer could one wait until the war was under way before
gaining an ally. The war might already be decided before an ally could be
found. Offensive dominance in military technology made preparation a
vital part of defense and strategy of the time. With the offensive weapons
having such an advantage, the Dual Alliance, while pretending to be a pact
for defensive security, actually posed an offensive threat to Russia.
This brings us to an important consideration: how did Tsarist Russia
perceive the alliance? Especially, if it was a secret treaty, how did the Tsar
know that it was only defensive in character? Though the alliance was
secret, enough information about its existence was passed on to Prussia to
174 Jack S. Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior, and
Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," Journal Qf Conflict Resolution 25,
no. 4 (1981): 606.
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make the Tsar worry about the treaty's exact contents and character. What
might have been considered a defensive war for Germany or for the Dual
Monarchy might not have been seen as that to Russia, or to anybody else for
that matter (as in 1914). Thus, although the Dual Alliance was not
intended to do so, it in fact created worse problems. The completion of the
treaty reinforced Russia's suspicions that at the Congress of Berlin,
Germany threw its complete support behind Austria-Hungary, and now
with the 1879 treaty, Bismarck intended to continue that policy. Thus, it
appeared that as long as the Dual Alliance was in existence, RussoGerman (and certainly not Austro-Russian) relations could never be truly
good again. The Three Emperors' League or the Reinsurance Treaty were
not enough--the Germans had made their choice, and in doing so, proved
(by keeping the Dual Alliance) that Berlin did not trust the Russians. This
development seems strange, as Bismarck always made sure that he had an
option in choosing between Russia and the Dual Monarchy. This was one
of the goals for Bismarck in creating the Dreikaiserbund. However, in
signing the alliance, Bismarck himself destroyed that freedom of choice
available to him in the Dreikaiserbund by siding with Austria-Hungary in
1879.

While alliances in general do not inevitably create rival groupings,
the Dual Alliance of October 1879 "generated counter-alliances, which
generated further mistrust and tensions, leading to an arms race, and the
further polarization of the alliance structure."175 Despite the best effort of
Russia to recreate close ties with Germany, they never felt totally safe.
Eventually, the Tsar's regime felt compelled to look for another friend to
175 lbid., 582.
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protect against this threat on the crucial western border. Although many
other things had to occur between 1879 and 1894 to prompt the Romanovs to
turn to the French Republic, Russia finally completed this step with their
alliance with France in 1894. This was just exactly what Bismarck had
wanted to avoid. As a result, the stage was set for a European conflict.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Although the Dual Alliance of October 1879 between Imperial
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire is an early factor in the
origins of the First World War, the alliance played an important part in the
roots of the war. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 showed that as long as a
strong Germany existed, Berlin's relations with Russia would be much
different and more difficult than before unification. Even so, close relations
were not impossible. However, from the Russian perspective, Chancellor
Bismarck took up and supported the Austrian (and English) cause at the
Congress. Though Tsar Alexander II over-reacted to the Congress, it was
Germany's decision to sign the Dual Alliance, thereby creating the first
obvious split in relations between the Three Northern Powers. If the Tsar
acted hastily in his response to the Treaty of Berlin, perhaps Bismarck did
so too, in October of 1879. Since the treaty was regularly renewed
thereafter, relations between the three empires steadily drifted further
apart. As it then eventually became apparent that Germany was going to
remain pro-Austrian, the Russians had little choice but to go to Paris in
1894, especially as German military and economic strength grew
enormously in the 1890's. Such a French-Russian Alliance would not have
been necessary without the existence of the Dual Alliance. If Bismarck
made an especially serious mistake concerning the Dual Alliance, it
consisted in the fact that the treaty was always renewed without the
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addition of Russia. If that had come about, then perhaps the course of
history might have been quite different. The "Great War" of 1914-1918
might have been avoided, or, at least, fought with different alliance
systems.
But the question is, would the Dual Alliance have come about without
the Congress of Berlin? Possibly, but not as early as 1879. This can be said
by considering the relations between the Three N orthem Powers between
1871 (the unification of Germany) and 1878. Though there were some
significant differences between the three, in particular, between Russia
and Austria-Hungary, relations had never been so tense as to bring the
situation to a war. Rumors of a possible war were one thing, but actual
preparation for war was another. The Congress of Berlin, however,
represented the first time that Russia went beyond discussing a war, and
actually started serious preparations for hostilities. Thus, the Congress of
Berlin appears to be the key factor that brought on the eventual split
between Germany and Russia concerning the place of Austria-Hungary in
Balkan politics. For it was Austria-Hungary that brought on the problems
between Berlin and St. Petersburg. But for the Dual Monarchy, there would
have been no serious quarrels between Germany and Russia, at least none
severe enough to threaten relations. Before the Congress, Bismarck had
been able to keep the other two powers reasonably content in the Balkans.
As the 1878 meeting neared, Bismarck had realized that the Habsburg
Monarchy presented a more stable ally, but he still participated in the
Congress with the intent to do what he could for Russia. Since the German
chancellor found at the Congress that Russia could never be fully satisfied,
and after the Tsar threatened war, Bismarck concluded he had no choice

00
but to secure the position of both Germany and the Dual Monarchy with a
military alliance. This decision would dominate German foreign relations
until 1918.
Actually hostilities did not actually erupt between the three states
until 1914, a prime point of origin for the problems in 1914 began with the
1878 Congress of Berlin. If historians are looking for a root cause for "The
Great War", then the 1878 Congress of Berlin must be considered as one of
the most crucial ingredients in the final decisions in August 1914. This
fact, more than any other, is why the 1878 Congress of Berlin should be
studied carefully as a true watershed in European diplomatic history.
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